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 3
1 Introduction 
This report covers the subject of threat and attack assessment and management relating to 
critical infrastructures in general, and electric power infrastructures in particular.  
The security of a specific infrastructure depends not only on its internal (characteristic) 
vulnerabilities, but also on the vulnerabilities of the infrastructures it relates to (depending or 
dependent). Moreover, recognizing vulnerability as a weakness of the system makes the security 
of a given infrastructure being jeopardise in the same manner by unintentional events and the 
factors that may take advantage of a given vulnerability. Of particular relevance are the malicious 
acts that can use vulnerabilities for launching an aggression against the infrastructure (being 
terrorism, war, activists or antagonists of different kind). 
This report outlines the state-of-the-art in dealing with threats and malicious attacks, considering 
both physical and cyber actions. It also discusses some approaches taken at national and 
international levels towards securing the critical infrastructures. 
All infrastructure facilities face a certain level of risk associated with various threats. These 
threats may be the result of natural events, accidents, or intentional acts to cause harm. 
Regardless of the nature of the threat, a systematic analysis is required, which should entail 
identifying relevant actions regarding the protection and prevention of the threats, and the 
detection, reaction and mitigation of the attacks. 
Threat assessments should consider the full spectrum of threats (i.e., natural, criminal, terrorist, 
accidental, etc.) for each installation. In the specific case of infrastructures, this assessment 
should also have to look at different locations and facilities.  
The assessment should consider supporting information in order to evaluate the likelihood of 
occurrence for each threat.  
For natural threats, historical data concerning frequency of occurrence for given natural disasters 
such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, fire, or earthquakes can be used to determine the 
credibility of the given threat.  
Evaluating a terrorist threat is a much more difficult problem. The attractiveness of the facility as a 
target is a primary consideration. However, measuring ‘attractiveness’ is most of the times a 
subjective process, which lacks of quantitative procedures. In addition, the type of terrorist act 
may vary based on the potential adversary and the method of attack most likely to be successful 
for a given scenario. For example, a terrorist wishing to strike against an energy infrastructure 
may be more likely to attack isolated installations than to attack a power station with permanent 
personnel and guarded fences.  
In general, the likelihood of terrorist attacks cannot be quantified statistically since terrorism is, by 
its very nature, random. Hence, when considering terrorist threats, the concept of developing 
credible composite threat including multiple actions is important. 
The report goes as follows: Chapter 2 covers a short introduction to the electric power 
infrastructure and industrial control systems, seen from a threat oriented perspective. The main 
differences between securing the industrial control systems and the traditional ICT systems are 
also stressed out in this chapter. Chapter 3 introduces the threat and vulnerability concepts and 
problematique, also providing an approach to the management of threats and mitigation of 
vulnerabilities (cyber-oriented). Security risk assessment is the subject of Chapter 4. Different 
standards and guidelines, as well as national approaches are reviewed in Chapter 5.  
This report is the result of work executed in the context of the project ‘Understanding Malicious 
Attacks to Infrastructures’, partially funded by the Dutch Foundation ‘Next Generation 
Infrastructure’. The project is a collaboration with the Politecnico di Torino and Istituto Superiore 
sui Sistema Territoriali per l'Innovazione (SiTI). 
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2 Electric Power Infrastructures 
2.1 Power Systems and Physical Threats 
The power infrastructure is composed of: 
• Power stations 
• Substations 
• Transmission lines 
All of them can be subject to physical threats. At the same time, those components are also 
interconnected through communication networks (wired and wireless), which can be the objective 
of physical threats. 
Accidental physical threats can be caused by natural events. Historically this is the most 
significant cause of outages. On the other hand, utilities know how to manage these situations 
based on their long experience. Power facilities are generally designed to minimize the impact 
and to promptly recover the service. Operational procedures are in place for quickly responding 
to storms and other natural disasters, and the responses are exercised periodically. 
Deliberate physical attacks can cause serious damage to transmission lines, due to their fragility 
and to the impossibility to protect their whole extension. Transformers and communication towers 
are also very sensitive to physical attacks, but they are normally adequately protected. Of 
particular importance is the possibility to orchestrate multiple attacks to different components of 
the infrastructure. Due to the large geographical extent of such systems and to the fact that many 
constitutive elements are located in remote, isolated areas, multiple coordinated ‘easy to 
implement’ attacks may lead to great damage to the system as a whole. Well known are the 
activities of some terrorists groups against power infrastructures (e.g. ETA in Spain, groups in 
Colombia and the Philippines).  
Accidental physical threats that can affect electric power infrastructures are: 
• Hurricanes 
• Tornadoes 
• Wind (beyond design specifications) 
• Earthquakes 
• Snow/ice (beyond design specifications) 
• Floods 
• Static Electricity 
• Extreme Temperatures 
• Lightning 
• Avalanches/slides 
• Volcanoes eruptions 
• Fires 
Man-made physical threats can be: deliberate (fire, explosions, radio frequency interference), or 
accidental (spills, fire, erroneous mechanical/electrical malfunction, etc.).    
2.2 Industrial Control Systems and Cyber Threats 
A generic diagram of the components within a typical industrial control system is shown in Figure 
1 [1].  
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Measurement variables are transmitted to the controller from the process sensors. The controller 
interprets the sensor signals and generates corresponding control signals that are transmitted to 
the process actuators. Process changes result in new sensor signals, identifying the state of the 
process, to again be transmitted to the controller. The Human Machine Interface (HMI) allows a 
control engineer or operator to configure set points, control algorithms and parameters to the 
controller. The HMI also provides displays of status information, including alarms and other 
means of notifying the operator of malfunctions. Diagnostic and maintenance tools, which are 
often made available via modem and Internet enabled interfaces, allow control engineers, 
operators and vendors to monitor and change controller, actuator, and sensor properties from 
remote locations [2].  
 
 
Fig. 1 – Generic Industrial Control System 
2.2.1 Industrial Control Systems vs. ICT Systems  
In the last decade, some aspects concerning the security of industrial control systems have come 
to light revealing some differences with the security approach commonly adopted in traditional 
ICT systems and networks. These differences have been identified and described by the ISA99 
Committee [3] in its Technical Reports. There it is stated that the security plans for industrial 
production and control systems can in fact be developed on the basis of the experiences, plans 
and practices adopted in ICT systems. However, there are some critical differences from the 
operative point of view between the two systems that have a strong influence in the adoption of 
the required security countermeasures.  
The differences can be summarized as follows:  
• Risks and consequences. In ICT systems, the loss of files or documents can have an 
economical impact on the finances of the company. In an industrial system, the loss of 
data can have an impact on people security or on the integrity of installations or the 
environment where the plants are located, paving the way for other threats to the whole 
infrastructure.  
• Network Architecture. In ICT systems the typical architecture is client-server and the 
critical data are stored only on the server-side, limiting the elements to protect. In an 
industrial system, there isn’t a clear distinction between clients and servers, as the 
peripheral elements of the networks are both data source and receivers of commands 
from the other elements.  
• Availability. ICT systems mainly work during office hours and ICT managers can schedule 
system maintenance and system reboots without affecting normal operations. Industrial 
systems must be continuously in operation and it is normally possible to perform 
maintenance on the system without stopping production lines.  
• Response Time. Real-time applications are rarely used in ICT systems, thus the network 
performance is affected only by the total bandwidth and throughput on the physical links. 
On the contrary, industrial applications don’t generate too much traffic on the network, but 
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they require strict performance in terms of delay and jitter. In addition, during an 
emergency, the operators must response very quickly and often there is no time to 
perform strong authentication on the system.  
• Software. ICT systems employ well-known operating systems and software packages 
running on general purpose hardware, thus their vulnerabilities are rather well known, and 
keeping the systems updated is a routine function. Industrial systems are normally based 
on proprietary software packages installed on dedicated hardware, and only the 
manufacturers know how the system works. So, although it is possible to discover some 
system vulnerabilities, it is very hard to find a way to correct them. Typically, once a 
system is successfully installed and stable, it is never updated for fear to introduce 
instability and not guarantee the required level of reliability. In addition, it should be taken 
into account that there is a trend towards the adoption of typical ICT systems and network 
components (such as operating systems, protocols, etc.). This will result in the paradox of 
better knowing the vulnerabilities, while at the same time being more exposed to typical 
ICT threats. 
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3 Threats and Vulnerabilities  
Today’s economy has become fully dependent upon ICT and the information infrastructure. A 
network of networks directly supports the operation of all sectors – energy (electric power, oil and 
gas), transportation (rail, air, merchant marine), finance and banking, information and 
telecommunications, public health, emergency services, water, chemical, defence industrial base, 
food, agriculture, and postal and shipping. The reach of these computer networks exceeds the 
bounds of cyberspace. They also control physical objects such as electrical transformers, trains, 
pipeline pumps, chemical vats, and radars.  
3.1 Threats  
A spectrum of malicious actors can conduct attacks against critical information infrastructures. Of 
primary concern in this report is the threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing 
debilitating disruption to critical infrastructures, economy, or even national security [4]. The 
required technical sophistication to carry out such an attack is high – and partially explains the 
lack of a debilitating attack to date. However, there have been instances where attackers have 
exploited vulnerabilities that may be indicative of more destructive capabilities.  
Uncertainties exist as to the intent and full technical capabilities of several observed attacks. 
Enhanced cyber threat analysis is needed to address long-term trends related to threats and 
vulnerabilities. What is known is that the attack tools and methodologies are becoming widely 
available, and the technical capability and sophistication of users bent on causing havoc or 
disruption is improving.  
As an example, consider the “NIMDA” (“ADMIN” spelled backwards) attack. Despite the fact that 
NIMDA did not create a catastrophic disruption to the critical infrastructure, it is a good example 
of the increased technical sophistication showing up in cyber attacks. It demonstrated that the 
arsenal of weapons available to organized attackers now contains the capability to learn and 
adapt to its local environment. NIMDA was an automated cyber attack, a blend of a computer 
worm and a computer virus. It propagated across the USA with enormous speed and tried 
several different ways to infect computer systems it invaded until it gained access and destroyed 
files. It went from nonexistent to nationwide in an hour, lasted for days, and attacked 86,000 
computers.   
Speed is also increasing. Consider that two months before NIMDA, a cyber attack called Code 
Red infected 150,000 computer systems in 14 hours. Because of the increasing sophistication of 
computer attack tools, an increasing number of actors are capable of launching nationally 
significant assaults against critical infrastructures. In peacetime they may conduct espionage on 
Governments, university research centres, and private companies. They may also seek to 
prepare for cyber strikes during a confrontation by mapping information systems, identifying key 
targets, lacing infrastructure with back doors and other means of access. In wartime or crisis, 
adversaries may seek to intimidate the political leaders by attacking critical infrastructures and 
key economic functions or eroding public confidence in information systems.  
Cyber attacks can have serious consequences such as disrupting critical operations, causing loss 
of revenue and intellectual property, or loss of life. Countering such attacks requires the 
development of robust capabilities where they do not exist today, if the goal is to reduce 
vulnerabilities and deter those with the capabilities and intent to harm critical infrastructures [5].  
Cyberspace provides a means for organized attack on infrastructure from a distance. These 
attacks require only commodity technology, and enable attackers to obfuscate their identities, 
locations, and paths of entry. Not only does cyberspace provide the ability to exploit weaknesses 
in critical infrastructures, but it also provides a fulcrum for leveraging physical attacks by allowing 
the possibility of disrupting communications, hindering defensive or offensive response, or 
delaying emergency responders who would be essential following a physical attack [6].  
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3.2 A Five-Level Problem  
We present in the sequel the approach to the management of threats and mitigation of 
vulnerabilities in cyberspace taken in the U.S. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace [7]. 
According to the referenced document, ‘… managing threat and reducing vulnerability in 
cyberspace is a particularly complex challenge because of the number and range of different 
types of users. Cyberspace security requires action on multiple levels and by a diverse group of 
actors because literally hundreds of millions of devices are interconnected by a network of 
networks.’ A five levels approach is proposed for addressing the issue [7].  
3.2.1 Level 1 – Home User/Small Business  
‘Though not a part of a critical infrastructure the computers of home users can become part of 
networks of remotely controlled machines that are then used to attack critical infrastructures.‘ [7] 
Undefended home and small business computers are vulnerable to attackers who can employ 
the use of those machines without the owner’s knowledge. Such machines can then be used by 
third-party actors to launch for instance denial-of-service attacks on key Internet nodes and other 
important enterprises or critical infrastructures.  
3.2.2 Level 2 – Large Enterprises  
Large-scale enterprises (corporations, government agencies, and universities) are common 
targets for cyber attacks. Many such enterprises are part of critical infrastructures. Enterprises 
require clearly articulated, active information security policies and programs to audit compliance 
with cyber security best practices. According to the intelligence community, the networks of large 
enterprise will be increasingly targeted by malicious actors both for the data and the power they 
possess.  
3.2.3 Level 3 – Critical Sectors/Infrastructures  
An unified effort of organizations from different sectors (economy, government, academia) 
targeting the common cyber security problems is required for reducing the burden on individual 
enterprises. [7] states that ‘…such collaboration often produces shared institutions and 
mechanisms, which, in turn, could have cyber vulnerabilities whose exploitation could directly 
affect the operations of member enterprises and the sector as a whole. Enterprises can also 
reduce cyber risks by participating in groups that develop best practices, evaluate technological 
offerings, certify products and services, and share information. Several sectors have formed what 
are called following the USA’s terminology Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) to 
monitor for cyber attacks directed against their respective infrastructures. ISACs are also a 
vehicle for sharing information about attack trends, vulnerabilities, and best practices.’  
3.2.4 Level 4 – National Issues and Vulnerabilities  
Some cyber security problems have implications and cannot be solved by individual enterprises 
or infrastructure sectors alone. All sectors share the Internet. Accordingly, they are all at risk if its 
mechanisms (e.g., protocols and routers) are not secure. Weaknesses in widely used software 
and hardware products can also create problems at the national level, requiring coordinated 
activities for the research and development of improved technologies. Additionally, the lack of 
trained and certified cyber security professionals also merits national level concern.  
3.2.5 Level 5 – Global  
The worldwide web is a planetary information grid of systems. Internationally shared standards 
enable interoperability among the world’s computer systems. This interconnectedness, however, 
also means that problems on one continent have the potential to affect computers on another. 
International cooperation is needed to share information related to cyber issues and, further, to 
prosecute cyber criminals. Without such cooperation, the collective ability to detect, deter, and 
minimize the effects of cyber-based attacks would be greatly diminished.  
 9
3.3 Vulnerabilities  
The vulnerabilities of industrial ICT systems are the focus of several initiatives around the world. 
This is the result of the awareness about the urgency of the matter, and the lack of appropriate 
tools and means for dealing with the problem. In particular in the USA there have been a number 
of pioneer actions: the development of laboratories, test beds and test ranges for industrial ICT 
(e.g. the Idaho National Laboratory, the National SCADA Test Bed Program), the Cybersecurity 
Industry Alliance, the Chemical Cybersecurity program, etc.  
In 2003, Sandia National Laboratories has engaged in vulnerability assessments of ICT systems 
with the main focus on control and automation systems used in critical infrastructures. The report 
[8] contains the results of the study, part of them being also provided in the sequel.  
Most security vulnerabilities in infrastructure include failures to adequately define security 
sensitivity for automation system data, identify and protect a security perimeter, build 
comprehensive security through defence-in-depth, and restrict access to data and services to 
authenticated users based on operational requirements. Many of these vulnerabilities result from 
deficient or nonexistent security governance and administration, as well as budgetary pressure 
and employee attrition in system automation.  
Also, the industry is largely unaware of the threat environment and adversary capabilities. Finally, 
automation administrators themselves cause many security deficiencies, through the widespread 
deployment of complex modern information technology equipment in control systems without 
adequate security education and training. Comprehensive mitigation includes improved security 
awareness, development of strong and effective security governance, and amelioration of 
security vulnerabilities through the careful configuration and integration of technology.  
The security of control systems depends upon five heterogeneous categories of elements, given 
in the sequel [8].  
3.3.1 System Data  
System security oriented towards data focuses on preserving the availability, authenticity, 
integrity, and confidentiality of data. Preserving these attributes ensures the reliable operation of 
the overall system. 
3.3.2 Security Administration  
[8] states that ‘The administration constituent of a control system encompasses such non-
automation functions as documentation and procedure. The cardinal element of documentation is 
the system security policy, which prescribes the goals and responsibilities for security.’ The 
security policy is the origin for every other required administrative component, which 
subsequently prescribes procedures for system implementation, operation, and maintenance.  
Table 1 shows a list of common vulnerabilities related to security administration [8]. 
3.3.3 Architecture  
The architecture of control systems refers to its control and data storage hierarchy. The 
architecture for the distribution of automation functionality is critical to reliability of the functional 
whole. At one extreme, the totally centralized authority for automation means that remote stations 
function as little more than boundaries for analog and digital control and measurement signals; 
this is the decades-old traditional model. At the other extreme, a completely decentralized 
authority resembles the agent model, where operations depend on the emergent behaviour of 
smaller entities with limited capabilities and viewpoints.  
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Category  Vulnerability  
The control system has no specific documented 
security policy. This key vulnerability generates the 
proliferation of procedural and technical vulnerabilities  Policy  
The control system often has no specific or documented 
security plan  
Implementation guides for equipment and systems are 
usually absent or deficient  
There are no administrative mechanisms for security 
enforcement in the system lifecycle  
Procedures  
Security audits are rarely performed, if at all  
Training  There is neither formal security training nor official documented security procedures  
Configuration 
Management  
Usually, there is no formal configuration management 
and no officially documented procedures. Hence, there 
are neither formal requirements, nor a consistent 
approach for configuration  
Table 1 Common vulnerabilities related to control system administration [8] 
Category  Vulnerability  
Minimal data flow control is employed (e.g. minimal use 
of access control lists, virtual private networks, or virtual 
LANs)  
Configurations are not stored or backed up for network 
devices  
Passwords are not encrypted in transit  
Passwords exist indefinitely on network devices  
Passwords on devices are shared  
Administration  
Minimal administrative access controls are applied  
There is inadequate physical protection of network 
equipment  
Non-critical personnel have physical access to 
equipment  Hardware  
No security perimeter has been defined for the system 
that defines access points which must be secured  
Firewalls are nonexistent or poorly configured at 
interfaces to external networks (that is, not related to 
control system)  Perimeter  
Control system networks are used for other kind of 
traffic  
Firewall and router logs are neither collected nor 
examined  Monitoring & 
Logging  There is no security monitoring on the control system 
network  
Critical monitoring and control paths are unidentified, 
complicating redundancy or contingency plans  Link Security  Control system connections over vulnerable links are 
not protected with encryption  
Authentication for remote access is substandard or 
nonexistent  Remote Access  Remote access into the control system network utilizes 
shared password and shared accounts  
Wireless 
Connections  
Wireless LAN technology used in control system 
network without strong authentication and/or data 
protection between clients and access points  
Table 2 – Common vulnerabilities for control system networks [8] 
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3.3.4 Network  
Control systems networks include all data transmission elements owned and administered by the 
infrastructure utility. Networking devices include lower-level end communications equipment 
(modems), advanced networking devices (routers, firewalls, etc.), and the link equipment itself 
(cables, rights-of-way, microwave dishes, etc.). Network functionality includes the capability of the 
network to deliver SCADA messages securely and reliably to support system operation. Table 2 
shows a list of common vulnerabilities related to control system networks.  
 
3.3.5 Platforms  
SANDIA considers “Platforms” as encapsulating both the computing hardware (inclusive of 
specific industrial platforms) and software (like applications and operating systems) in control 
systems.  
Table 3 shows a list of common vulnerabilities related to software and hardware platforms utilized 
in control system networks.  
Category  Vulnerability  
Operating system security patches are not maintained  
Configurations are not stored or backed up for 
important platforms, including intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs)  
Default operating system configurations are utilized, 
which enables insecure and unnecessary services  
Software 
Passwords are often stored in plain sight near critical 
systems  
Power-on and screen saver passwords are not utilized  
Passwords are not encrypted in transit  
Passwords exist indefinitely on platforms  
Passwords on devices are shared  
There are no time limit, character length, or character 
type requirements for the passwords  
Minimal administrative access controls are applied  
Users have administrator privileges  
Administration  
There is inadequate physical protection of critical 
platforms  
Non-critical personnel have physical access to 
equipment  Hardware  Dial-up access exists on individual workstation within 
the SCADA network  
Monitoring & 
Logging  System logs are neither collected nor examined  
Malware Protection  Virus checking software in uninstalled, unused, or not updated  
Table 3 – Common vulnerabilities related to software and hardware platforms [8] 
3.4 Preventive Actions 
In USA, the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the Department of Energy 
have developed the steps outlined in to help any organization improve the security of its SCADA 
networks. These steps are not meant to be prescriptive or all-inclusive. However, they do address 
essential actions to be taken to improve the protection of SCADA networks. The steps are divided 
into two categories: specific actions to improve implementation, and actions to establish essential 
underlying management processes and policies.  
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The Department of Energy plays a key role in protecting the critical energy infrastructure of the 
nation as specified in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. In fulfilling this responsibility, 
the Secretary of Energy’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance has 
conducted a number of assessments of organizations with SCADA networks to develop an in-
depth understanding of SCADA networks and steps necessary to secure these networks. The 
Office of Energy Assurance also fulfils Energy Department responsibilities through their work with 
Federal, State, and private partners to protect the National Energy Infrastructure, improve energy 
reliability, and assist in energy emergency response efforts. 
Even if these steps have been identified in USA, they can surely be a valid starting point for 
improve the protection of critical infrastructures from cyber attack all over the world. 
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4 Security Risk Assessment 
4.1 Cyber threats and Industrial Information and Communication 
Technologies  
Securing computer systems that control industrial production and distribution is vital for the 
protection of key components of critical infrastructures and the health of the associated 
economies at risk. Current systems are designed first and foremost to meet performance, 
reliability, safety and flexibility requirements. Yet, as these systems are steadily integrated with 
information and communication technology (ICT) solutions to promote more advanced 
functionalities, corporate connectivity and remote access capabilities, serious new vulnerabilities 
are being introduced into operational system components [4][9].   
Cyber attacks on industrial production and distribution systems, including electric, oil and gas, 
water treatment and distribution systems, could endanger public health and safety as well as 
invoke serious damage to the environment. Attack on any industrial control system could also 
result in serious financial implications including loss of production, generation or distribution of a 
product, or compromise of proprietary information and creation of liability issues.  
As shown in 2.2.1, real-time computer control systems used in industrial control applications have 
many characteristics that are different from traditional information processing systems used in 
business applications. Primary among these is the design for efficiency and time-critical 
response. Security in these systems is generally not a strong design driver and therefore has 
tended to be bypassed in favour of performance and control requirements. Furthermore, the 
goals of safety and security sometimes conflict with the design and operation of control systems 
[10] [11] [12].   
Furthermore, due to the increasing interconnection among systems and organisations, the 
probability and potential impact of security breaches have grown heavily in recent years. Because 
of the complexity of the security issues and the rapid pace of change, the decision makers must 
identify, assess, weigh, and establish priorities for threats and vulnerabilities and to identify and 
evaluate options for action. In summary, it is necessary to: 
1. Understand the threats involved 
2. Appreciate vulnerabilities 
3. Make timely, coordinated, and effective actions 
Of great importance is the assessment of malicious threats, and in particular those deriving from 
terrorist actors.  
Garrick et. all [13] offer a methodology for quantitatively assessing the risks of terrorism to make 
the right decisions for countering them. The overall framework for action is composed of the 
following procedures: 
• Step 1 Information gathering and processing 
• Step 2 Risk assessment 
• Step 3 Decision-making and action implementation 
4.1.1  Information Gathering and Processing 
The prerequisite for risk analysis is to have adequate supporting information. Therefore, it is 
necessary to gather observations, evidence, proofs, and other relevant data from various sources 
and convert them into a numerical form suitable for risk assessment (Step 2) and for the 
subsequent decision analyses (Step 3). The questions addressed in these steps are: 
Which threats should be considered the most serious based on existing evidence? 
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What supporting information can be obtained for the analysis of those threats? 
Obviously, these first two steps aim at screening out the less important threats so that resources 
can be concentrated on the more serious, more credible ones. 
4.1.2 Risk Assessment 
The most likely malicious attack scenarios, including their potential consequences, should be 
identified, analyzed, and developed based on the information gathering and processing phase. 
Risk assessment entails a three-part process: 
• Threat assessment  
o includes the analysis not only on the intentions and capabilities of the malicious 
actors, but also of the potential targets and aggressive means delivery systems; 
• System analysis  
o refers to the system being attacked and the need to define successful operation of 
the system as a baseline for knowing how the system can fail or be destroyed; 
• Vulnerability assessment  
o is the response of the system to the threat and includes the appraisal of the 
consequences.  
This step is crucial as risk analyses are essential to making the right decisions. 
4.1.3 Decision Making and Actions Implementation 
Decision analysis involves determining the risks, costs, and benefits of different alternatives 
available to the decision makers. Good decisions are strongly dependent on the risks analysis 
process. The decisions making is followed by the implementation of actions. 
The general aforementioned framework, along with other state-of-art security issues 
contemporarily concerned in power system, will be specifically recounted in the subsequent 
sections. 
4.2 The case of the electric power system 
4.2.1 Information Gathering and Processing 
i. Defining the System 
The objective is to define the system being analyzed in terms of what constitutes normal 
operation, what constitutes anomalous states, and which are the points of vulnerability. This will 
serve as a baseline for the risk assessment and the operation of the systems. The purpose is to 
understand how the system works so deviates from normal, successful operation can be easily 
identified. Once the system is understood, vulnerabilities that require special analysis can be 
identified. 
In the case of the electrical grid, the main components are:  
• substations,  
• transmission lines (especially the extra high-voltage transmission lines),  
• SCADA systems, and  
• Energy Management Systems (EMS).  
Each of these components represents a potential point of vulnerability and therefore must be 
characterised. The characterisation should look at the structural elements (i.e. the topology and 
interconnection among components), their functionality, and their operational behaviour under 
different conditions. 
For the characterisation the questions include but are not limited to: 
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• Is the generating capacity in the grid sufficient to meet load demands during peak 
periods? 
• Which substation(s) supply the majority customers? 
• Where could there be potential bottleneck(s)? 
ii. Characterizing the Threat 
Once the system is described, the threats associated with it can be identified and characterized. 
A threat is defined as “a potential cause of an unwanted incident which may result in harm to a 
system or organization”  [14]. In more general terms, it connotes an initiating event that can 
cause harm to a system or induce it to fail.  
The Common Criteria [15] characterizes threat as a 4-tuple: a threat agent, a presumed attack 
method, the vulnerability exploited by the attack and the asset under attack. According to this 
definition, threats are defined with reference to specific vulnerabilities and assets. For the sake of 
discrimination, [16] characterizes a threat by a 3-tuple, the threat agent, the threat mode and the 
threat determinant. 
NERC developed five colour-coded threat alert level definitions addressing both cyber and 
physical security [17][18] Each level represents an increasing degree of potential threat, ranging 
from low-green, guarded-blue, elevated-yellow, high-orange to severe-red. The threat alert level 
does not have to apply consistently to all corporate locations and assets. A company could 
specify a unique threat alert level for a particular region, city, or type of facility. 
Considering the intimate connections between power systems and society’s other infrastructures, 
[19] has summed up the threats of power system into three categories: 
• Those that can be related to attacks upon the power system.  
o In this case, the electricity infrastructure itself is the primary target – with outages 
rippling into the customer base. 
• Those that can be related to attacks by the power system.  
o The ultimate target is the population, using parts of the electricity infrastructure as 
a weapon. 
• Those that can be related to attacks through the power system.  
o The target is the civil infrastructure in this case. 
Modern security threats have increased in both the physical and cyber areas, characterized from 
inadvertent (natural disaster, equipment failure etc) to malicious (hackers attack, warfare etc). 
• Physical Threats:  
o Numerous physical methods, such as facility break-ins, weapon attacks, or bomb 
explosions, could be used to damage the elements of power system with varying 
degrees of damage to the network and the region. 
• Cyber Threats:  
o A cyber attack could be planned, coordinated, and carried out from almost 
anywhere in the world where there is a connection to the Internet. The cyber 
systems in power industry mainly consist of two categories — the control system 
and the management information system. The former mainly refers to the 
SCADA/EMS system; the latter includes all the management and information 
software in power industry. An important concept relevant to cyber attack is 
information security, it is defined as the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information [20]. 
4.2.2 Risk assessment 
Risk is measured in terms of scenarios (what will happen), likelihood (how likely it is to happen), 
and consequences (what the results would be). The parameter selected for measuring risk is 
based on the probability of the success rate of different levels of damage. 
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Risk assessment is an integral part of the electricity sector’s definition of critical infrastructure 
[21][22][23]. The final objective is to support risk management in safeguarding the essential 
components of the electric infrastructure against physical and cyber threats. As the grid 
interconnects different operators and countries, the assessment and management of risk has to 
be done in a manner consistent with both industry and industry-government partnerships, while 
sustaining public confidence in the electricity sector. The most difficult part of the risk assessment 
process is the development of realistic, quantitative estimates for the likelihood of each potential 
failure, including consistent evaluations of the uncertainties in each estimate. 
i. Constructing Scenarios 
The malicious attacker and the risk analyst must both think in terms of scenarios or sequences of 
events. This is the core of the risk assessment. The scenarios show how specific damage levels 
can result from physical attacks on the system hardware, cyber attacks on system controls, and 
combinations of these attacks [24] [25]. 
It is convenient to structure malicious attack scenarios from the point of view of the system that is 
attacked. The first step is to develop a diagram describing the success scenario that leads to a 
successful end-state or normal operating procedures for the system without the intervention of a 
terrorist event. The second step is to develop the meaningful initiating events that could disrupt 
the normally operating system and assess their likelihoods. The likelihood of attack scenarios is 
quantified in terms of three explicit and quantitative interpretations — frequency, probability, and 
probability of frequency. 
• Frequency:  
o The frequency of the recurrent scenario can be expressed in occurrences per day, 
per year, per trial, per demand, etc. 
• Probability:  
o If the scenario is not recurrent, that is, it happens either once or not at all, then its 
likelihood can be quantified in terms of probability. It is the degree of credibility of 
the hypothesis in question, based on the totality of relevant evidence available. 
• Probability of frequency: 
o If the scenario is recurrent, and therefore has a frequency, but the numerical value 
of that frequency is not fully known, and if there is some evidence relevant to that 
numerical value, then Bayes Theorem [26][27] can be used to develop a 
probability curve over the frequency axis. This ‘probability of frequency’ 
interpretation of likelihood is the most informative, and thus is the preferred way of 
capturing and quantifying the state of knowledge about the likelihood of a defined 
scenario. 
Specific scenarios that will be developed further are (1) a physical attack on the electrical grid; 
and (2) a complementary simultaneous cyber attack on the electrical grid. 
i.1 Physical Attack Scenarios 
Figure 1 shows an example of the systematic thought process used to develop the attack 
scenarios and to assign their consequences to the damage levels. Branches can be added to 
account for other protective barriers in each system. The purpose of this exercise is to create a 
comprehensive framework for identifying vulnerabilities and in turn make better decisions. 
i.2 Cyber Attack Scenarios 
The cyber attack can be divided into five phases [13]: 
1. Discovery phase.  
It begins with the identification of potential targets (mostly via the Internet). This could be 
done using search engines by typing in keywords, and then assemble the critical information, 
such as IP addresses, about these electric utility companies. 
2. Launch platform acquisition.  
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Cyber attacks are typically carried out through a series of computers, which makes it very 
difficult to trace the source of the attack, even if it has been discovered. The attackers would 
arrange administrative privileges on the computer systems with vulnerabilities and then go 
dormant, covering their tracks by deleting log entries and using other stealth techniques. In 
this manner, they would compromise a series of computer systems from which they could 
launch their cyber attacks remotely. 
 
Fig. 2 - An example of thought process for attack scenarios 
 
3. Target selection.  
Once an electric utility had been selected as a target, the attackers would activate some of 
the computers exploited in the platform acquisition phase, transferring the prowl tools that are 
readily available on the Internet to the compromised computers. When these tools are 
successful, they can install a number of surveillance/reconnaissance tools that would 
automatically cover up any sign that the utility computer had been compromised. 
4. Target reconnaissance and compromise.  
In this phase, the cyber attackers would attempt to assess the number of other computers in 
the network that ‘trust’ the computer system compromised in the previous stage and to what 
extent. They could then use these trust relationships to inspect other computer systems on 
the network, as well as to discover other local networks. The cyber attackers might also install 
packet sniffers to listen in on network traffic for packets destined for ports specific to a 
particular SCADA system. Once they found SCADA port traffic, they could identify the 
computer systems being used as SCADA systems. 
5. Initiation of an attack.  
The final step would involve compromising one or more of the computer systems that run the 
SCADA system. Once the SCADA system was compromised, the amount of damage inflicted 
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on the components of the power grid reachable by the compromised SCADA system would 
depend on the attacker’s knowledge of electric power systems. 
We can form a simple cyber attack scenario with respect to the example in i.1. According to figure 
1, one possible way to achieve damage state 4 is first to bring down the network (by a physical 
attack), and then to override or block the regional SCADA protection and control systems (by a 
cyber attack) so that frequency stabilization, load shedding, and islanding protocols or automatic 
supplies from other interconnected regional grid could not be quickly implemented or provided. 
Thus, the failures of one network can cascade throughout the regional grid. If the major regional 
tie-lines remain connected to the attacked network, the entire grid may be quickly collapse [28]. 
In fact, most cyber attacks are multistep attacks composed by a set of attack actions. The paper 
[29] proposes an algorithm for constructing attack scenario based on modelling multistep cyber 
attacks. 
i.3 Results Assembly 
Once the individual scenarios have been quantified, they can be assembled into risk measures. 
This is a matter of combining all scenarios that terminate in a specific damage category.  
The results take the form of the graph in figure 3, which shows the curve for a single scenario or 
a set of scenarios leading to a single consequence. Each scenario has a probability-of-frequency 
curve quantifying its likelihood of occurrence. 
 
Fig. 3 - Probability-of-frequency curve 
Showing different levels of damage requires a different type of presentation. The most common 
form is the classical risk curve, also known as the frequency-of-exceed curve. This curve is 
constructed by ordering the scenarios by increasing levels of damage and cumulating the 
probabilities from the bottom up in the ordered set against the different damage levels. Plotting 
the results on log-log paper generates curves, as shown in figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4 - Risk curve for varying consequences 
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Suppose P3 has the value of 0.95, that is a probability of 0.95, and suppose we want to know the 
risk of an X1 consequence at the 95% confidence level. According to the figure, we are 95% 
confident that the frequency of an X1 consequence or greater is 1Φ : The family of curves (usually 
called percentiles) can include as many curves as necessary. The ones most often selected in 
practice are the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles. 
It’s necessary to notice that although Figs. 3 and 4 can provide a perspective on the actual risks 
and in establishing priorities for threats, targets, and vulnerabilities, the most important thing is to 
rank the importance of contributors to a risk by analyzing the curves in Figs. 3 and 4. 
ii. Threat and Vulnerabilities Assessment 
Based on the assembly results, by linking the threat assessment with vulnerability assessment, 
we would be able to answer questions such as which threats and vulnerabilities can be matched 
in a given power grid; what are the contributing factors and how do they rank in importance; what 
actions will have the biggest payoff in terms of risk reduction for the amount of resources 
invested. These answers are the key points to make decisions or develop countermeasures when 
system is confronting the risk. 
The threat assessment includes events and activities leading up to the attack but does not 
assess or speculate on the malicious actors’ decision to initiate the attack. The threat analysis 
generates the initiating events for the vulnerability assessment. In other words, the output of the 
threat assessment is the input to the vulnerability assessment. 
Vulnerabilities are the faults that might result in accidental events, or that might expose the 
system to threats [30]. The sources of vulnerability include natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and winter storms), equipment failures, human errors in the design, configuration, 
operation or maintenance of the system [31]. 
The main task of vulnerability assessment is to evaluate the level of system strength or weakness 
relative to the occurrence of an undesired event. USA’s DOE has conducted a number of 
vulnerability assessments for energy infrastructure providers. The suite of tasks that are often 
included in the vulnerability assessment can be summarized as [32]: 
• Evaluate the threat environment:  
o Characterizing the threats, combining with an appreciation of the value of the 
assets and systems, and impact of unauthorized access and subsequent 
malicious activity. 
• Information network architecture assessment:  
o Providing an independent analysis of the enterprise assurance features of the 
information network(s) associated primarily with infrastructure control systems, 
such as SCADA and EMS [33][34][35]. 
• Cyber security assessment, including penetration testing of information systems:  
o Utilizing active scanning and penetration tools to identify network vulnerabilities 
that might be easily exploited by a determined adversary. Additionally, there is 
strong interest in determining whether access can be gained to critical 
applications. 
• Physical security assessment:  
o Evaluating the physical security systems in place or planned, and to identify 
potential physical security improvements for the sites evaluated. The physical 
security analysis include access controls, barriers, locks and keys, badges and 
passes, intrusion detection devices and associated alarm reporting and display, 
closed circuit television (assessment and surveillance), communications 
equipment (telephone, two-way radio, intercom, cellular), lighting (interior and 
exterior), power sources (line, battery, generator), inventory control, postings 
(signs), security system wiring, and protective force. 
• Operations security assessment:  
o Denying potential adversaries information about capabilities and intentions of the 
host organization. 
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• Review administrative policies and procedures. 
• Physical asset analysis:  
o Examining the systems and physical operational assets to ascertain whether 
vulnerabilities exist. 
• Impact analysis:  
o Evaluating the impact on market and/or system operations associated with 
exploiting unauthorized access to critical assets. 
• Risk characterization:  
o Providing a structure under which options developed in the previous tasks can be 
compared and evaluated. 
Vulnerability assessment is a research topic that is gaining academic interest. Quantitative 
measures based on different approaches, such as vulnerability index [36], graph theory [37] and 
game theory [38] [39], are presented in a large amount of easy-to-access reference papers. 
Since it’s impossible to provide an exhaustive or an all-inclusive list here, this report won’t go 
further on this subject. 
iii. Making Decisions 
Generally speaking, to avoid physical attacks, one plausible action to consider would be to 
improve the security of the elements (substations, transmission lines etc) identified as the 
principal contributors to long-term outages for the power grid by the risk assessment.  
Another key high-priority technology for countering physical attacks is adaptive intelligent 
islanding [19]: When major disruptions occur on a power system, the transmission network 
automatically responds by breaking into self-contained islands, according to fixed procedures 
established well in advance. Such procedures have not generally been updated since the onset 
of deregulation and will not be adequate for dealing with a terrorist attack on multiple carefully 
chosen targets. Rather, we need a more flexible islanding method that can react instantaneously 
to attack conditions, taking into account the location and severity of damage, load status, and 
available generation. 
To avert cyber initiated attacks, strategies could be taken to reduce the uncertainties in the risk 
analysis and to find ways to discourage repeated attempts. Nowadays, several classes of 
commercially available products can be used to protect against cyber attacks. The first class is a 
number of computer firewall products that can recognize and deflect cyber attacks by restricting 
all incoming and outgoing network traffic unless the administrator of the firewall designates it. A 
second class of security devices, intrusion-detection systems, monitors incoming and outgoing 
network traffic for digital signatures of known cyber attack tools and ploys.  
However, utility decision makers face a number of challenges in the security area [40]. Therefore, 
it’s impossible to give a universal rule for how to make decisions when confronting the malicious 
attack, but standards and guidelines issued by government agencies, industry organizations and 
electricity utility operators could be used as a good reference baseline point. Furthermore, looking 
into some industrial successful efforts will also give insight into how to provide the needed 
coordination and establish a unified response to cyber threats. 
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5 Security Issues and Countermeasures: Standards and 
Guidelines 
5.1 Standards 
The importance of the security aspects in the electric power field is confirmed by the constitution 
of security working groups by standard organizations, such as IEC TC57 WG 15. WG 15 
published the Technical Report 62210 [41] which may be considered a valuable approach for 
introducing security in power system control. 
Based on the ideas in IEC TR 62210 [41] and taking into account the more commonly applied 
security standards (Common Criteria [15] and ISO/IEC 17799 [20]), CESI-JRC present a 
methodological approach to analyze the security of systems by identifying its assets, their 
vulnerabilities, the threats that might exploit the latter by means of attacks or accidental means, 
and the losses that could be caused [16]. 
Similar to ISO/IEC 17799, ISA [42] provides generic guidance in two reports. One report [43] 
deals with security technologies, and the other [44] discusses how to develop a security program 
for Manufacturing and Control Systems.  
In response to the increasing cyber and physical threats to electricity industry facilities, assets, 
and personnel, NERC devised a standardized set of protective measures [45] based on national 
security plans and guidelines developed by other agencies [17][18], on the basis of which, EPRI 
offers guidelines that an electric power company can use to develop or enhance its own threat 
alert level response plan [46]. This guideline along with its companion reports, EPRI Report 
1001639 [47] and EPRI Report 1008396 [48], provide a scope of information to the decision 
makers, who could in turn devise their own countermeasures against a particular threat. 
The Urgent Action Cyber Security Standard 1200 adopted by NERC in 2003 specifies actions to 
be taken to protect utility systems in 16 areas, such as access control, information protection, 
personnel training, incident response, and recovery planning, among others. This standard has 
been extended and modified for development into a set of permanent cyber security standards: 
CIP-002 through CIP-009. NERC also offered the corresponding implementation plan for these 
cyber security standards [49]. 
Operating a reliable information security system is an important cyber security-related issue. The 
standards of [20], [50], [51] give any organization a good basis to build an information security 
management system framework and implement security controls to fulfil security requirements. 
And in a similar way, any power utility could use the same basis and adapt security controls for its 
own needs, where [20] provides a sound check list of a great number of issues to be dealt with 
for proper handling of information security. However, the standards do not focus on control 
systems domains within the electric power industry and it is left to each power utility to adopt, 
adapt, or develop adequate policies and procedures to these domains [52], [53]. 
Many associated system operators regulate their own standards in terms of security and 
reliability. Take the strong-interconnected power grid UCTE as an example. According to UCTE 
Operation Handbook [54], the information security can be enhanced by the following measures: 
• All data exchanged must be transmitted over the Electronic Highway (EH) in sequence 
and in a timely manner. The EH is a private network dedicated to the electricity sector to 
be used by TSOs only. 
• EH transfers only UCTE-approved operational and electricity market data between TSOs. 
• EH shall use only protocols and formats approved by the responsible body of UCTE. 
• EH has no direct connection to the Internet. 
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In addition to the guidelines and standards above-mentioned, comprehensive discussions about 
security issues in power grid can also be found in [19], [39], [55] and [56]. 
5.1.1 Common Criteria 
Identifying threats is one of the core components of Security problem definition. CC puts the 
security issue in a threat-asset relationship. [57], states that ‘a threat consists of a threat agent, 
an asset and an adverse action of that threat agent on that asset). 
The threat agents are defined as ‘entities that can adversely act on assets.’ The threat is defined 
as a high level of abstraction. Thus, a threat agent may be anyone of the following: hackers, 
users, computer processes, TOE (Target of Evaluation – the IT system being assessed), 
development personnel, and accidents.  
In turn, threat agents may be further described by aspects such as expertise, resources, 
opportunity and motivation. They may be described as individual entities, but in some cases it 
may be better to describe them as types of entities, groups of entities etc.  
The same document defines Assets as entities that someone places value upon. To be more 
specific, some examples of what may be considered as assets are give in the sequel: contents of 
a file or a server; the authenticity of votes cast in an election; the availability of an electronic 
commerce process; the ability to use an expensive printer; access to a classified facility.  
Adverse actions are actions performed by a threat agent on an asset. These actions influence 
one or more properties of an asset from which that asset derives its value.  
The mentioned document also makes several recommendations on countering the threats. Thus, 
‘countering a threat does not necessarily mean removing that threat, it can also mean sufficiently 
diminishing that threat or sufficiently mitigating that threat [57]. The possible actions to counter 
the threat are removing, diminishing and mitigating the effects. Several examples of possible 
countermeasures are given in Table 4. 
An attack potential (AP) estimation methodology is proposed for vulnerability assessment in [58]. 
The method should be used based on the threat profile developed during Security Problem 
Definition / Security Target (ST). The following is a short introduction of the main definitions and 
concepts involved. The following are in line: 
• AP should be determined in consideration of the threat environment and the selection of 
assurance components  
• AP of the attackers of the TOE is generically characterised as Basic, Enhanced-Basic, 
Moderate or High. 
• The primary role of the attack potential is to determine whether or not the TOE is resistant 
to attacks assuming a specific attack potential of an attacker during vulnerability 
assessment.  
• Attack potential is a function of expertise, resources and motivation.  
According to [58] ‘Motivation is an attack potential factor that can be used to describe several 
aspects related to the attacker and the assets the attacker desires. Firstly, motivation can imply 
the likelihood of an attack - one can infer from a threat described as highly motivated that an 
attack is imminent, or that no attack is anticipated from an un-motivated threat. Secondly, 
motivation can imply the value of the asset, monetarily or otherwise, to either the attacker or the 
asset holder. An asset of very high value is more likely to motivate an attack compared to an 
asset of little value. Thirdly, motivation can imply the expertise and resources with which an 
attacker is willing to effect an attack.  
The following factors should be considered when characterizing the attack potential: 
1) Time taken to identify and exploit (Elapsed Time); the total amount of time taken by an 
attacker to identify that a particular potential vulnerability may exist in the TOE, to 
develop an attack method and to sustain effort required to mount the attack against 
the TOE. When considering this factor, the worst case scenario is used to estimate the 
amount of time required. The identified amount of time is as follows:  
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a) less than one day;  
b) between one day and one week;  
c) between one week and two weeks;  
d) between two weeks and one month;  
e) each additional month up to 6 months leads to an increased value;  
f) more than 6 months. 
Removing the ability to execute the adverse action from the threat 
agent. 
Moving, changing or protecting the asset in such a way that the adverse 
action is no longer applicable to it. Removing 
Remove the threat agent (e.g. removing machines from a network that 
frequently crash that network) 
Restrict the ability of a threat agent to perform adverse actions. 
Reduce the likelihood of an executed adverse action being successful. 
Reduce the motivation to execute an adverse action of a threat agent by 
deterrence. 
Restrict the opportunity to execute an adverse action of a threat agent. 
Diminishing 
Requiring greater expertise or greater resources from the threat agent. 
Making frequent back-ups of the asset. 
Insure an asset. 
Obtaining spare copies of an asset. Mitigate the effects 
Ensure that successful adverse actions are always timely detected, so 
that appropriate action can be taken. 
Table  4. Possible trheat contermeasures – Compiled from [58] 
 
2) Specialist technical expertise required (Specialist Expertise); the level of generic 
knowledge of the underlying principles, product type or attack methods (e.g. Internet 
protocols, Unix operating systems, buffer overflows). The identified levels are as 
follows:  
• Laymen are unknowledgeable compared to experts or proficient persons, with no 
particular expertise;  
• Proficient persons are knowledgeable in that they are familiar with the security 
behaviour of the product or system type;  
• Experts are familiar with the underlying algorithms, protocols, hardware, 
structures, security behaviour, principles and concepts of security employed, 
techniques and tools for the definition of new attacks, cryptography, classical 
attacks for the product type, attack methods, etc. implemented in the product or 
system type.  
• The level “Multiple Expert” is introduced to allow for a situation, where different 
fields of expertise are required at an Expert level for distinct steps of an attack. 
3) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (Knowledge of the TOE); specific expertise 
in relation to the TOE. This is distinct from generic expertise, but not unrelated to it. 
Identified levels are as follows:  
• Public information concerning the TOE (e.g. as gained from the Internet);  
• Restricted information concerning the TOE (e.g. knowledge that is controlled 
within the developer organisation and shared with other organisations under a 
non-disclosure agreement)  
• Sensitive information about the TOE (e.g. knowledge that is shared between 
discreet teams within the developer organisation, access to which is constrained 
only to members of the specified teams);  
• Critical information about the TOE (e.g. knowledge that is known by only a few 
individuals, access to which is very tightly controlled on a strict need to know basis 
and individual undertaking). 
4) Window of opportunity;  
5) IT hardware/software or other equipment  - the equipment required to identify or exploit 
vulnerabilities.  
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a) Standard equipment is readily available to the attacker, either for the identification 
of vulnerability or for an attack.  
b) Specialised equipment is not readily available to the attacker, but could be 
acquired without undue effort.  
c) Bespoke equipment is not readily available to the public as it may need to be 
specially produced (e.g. very sophisticated software), or because the equipment is 
so specialised that its distribution is controlled, possibly even restricted or very 
expensive.  
The document further details the assessment methodology. This is not presented here, since it 
gets out of the scope of this report. 
5.1.2 ISA (Instrument Society of America)  
ISA is a leading, global, non-profit organization that sets standard in the automation field.  Inside 
ISA, a specific committee (SP99) has been created [3]. This committee will establish standards, 
recommended practices, technical reports, and related information for implementing electronically 
secure manufacturing and control systems, and for the security practices and assessment of their 
security performance. The Committee’s focus is to improve the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of components or systems used for manufacturing or control and to provide criteria for 
procuring and implementing secure control systems.  
ISA99 published its Part 1 standard, ANSI/ISA-99.00.01-2007, Security for Industrial Automation 
and Control Systems: Concepts, Terminology and Models, [59] in late 2007. This Part 1 standard 
serves as the foundation for all subsequent standards in the ISA99 series.  
Also in late 2007, ISA99 published an updated version of its technical report, ANSI/ISA-
TR99.00.01-2007 Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems. [60] This 
technical report provides an assessment of cyber security tools, mitigation countermeasures, and 
technologies that may be applied to industrial automation and control systems regulating and 
monitoring numerous industries and critical infrastructures.  
The final ISA99 series will consist of 6 parts. It is being adopted as the basis of other standards, 
such as IEC 62443. 
5.1.3 ISO (International Organization for Standardization)  
ISO, in conjunction with IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission), forms the specialized 
system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate 
in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the 
respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical 
committees collaborate in fields of mutual interests.  
The International Standard ISO/IEC 27001 [61] has been prepared to provide a model for 
establishing, implementing, operating monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an 
Information Security Management System (ISMS). The adoption of ISMS should be a strategic 
decision for an organization. The design and implementation of an organization’s ISMS is 
influenced by their needs and objectives, security requirements, the processes employed and the 
size and structure of the organization. These and their supporting systems are expected to 
change over time. It is expected that an ISMS implementation will be scaled in accordance with 
the needs of the organization, e.g. a simple situation requires a simple ISMS solution.  
This International Standard adopts a process approach for establishing, implementing, operating, 
monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an organization's ISMS. An organization needs 
to identify and manage many activities in order to function effectively. Any activity using 
resources and managed in order to enable the transformation of inputs into outputs can be 
considered to be a process. Often the output from one process directly forms the input to the next 
process. The application of a system of processes within an organization, together with the 
identification and interactions of these processes, and their management, can be referred to as a 
“process approach”. The process approach for information security management presented in 
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this International Standard encourages its users to emphasize the importance of:  
1. understanding an organization’s information security requirements and the need to 
establish policy and objectives for information security;  
2. implementing and operating controls to manage an organization's information security 
risks in the context of the organization’s overall business risks;  
a) monitoring and reviewing the performance and effectiveness of the ISMS; and continual 
improvement based on objective measurement.  
This International Standard adopts the "Plan-Do-Check-Act" (PDCA) model, which is applied to 
structure all ISMS processes. Figure 2 illustrates how ISMS takes as input the information 
security requirements and expectations of the interested parties, and through the necessary 
actions and processes produces information security outcomes that meet them.  
The International Standard ISO/IEC 27002 [62], that replaces the standard ISO/IEC 17799 
provides best practice recommendations on information security management for use by those 
who are responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining ISMS. Information security is 
defined within the standard as the preservation of confidentiality (ensuring that information is 
accessible only to those authorised to have access), integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and 
completeness of information and processing methods) and availability (ensuring that authorised 
users have access to information and associated assets when required).  
The standard contains the following twelve main sections:  
1 Risk assessment  
2 Security policy: management direction  
3 Organization of information security: governance of information security  
4  Asset management: inventory and classification of information assets  
5 Human resources security: security aspects for employees joining, moving and 
leaving an organization  
6 Physical and environmental security: protection of the computer facilities  
7 Communications and operations management: management of technical security 
controls in systems and networks  
8 Access control: restriction of access rights to networks, systems, applications, 
functions and data  
9 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance: building security into 
applications  
10 Information security incident management: anticipating and responding appropriately 
to information security breaches  
11 Business continuity management: protecting, maintaining and recovering business-
critical processes and systems  
12 Compliance: ensuring conformance with information security policies, standards, laws 
and regulations  
 
 
Fig. 5 – Plan-Do-Check-Act model applied to information systems  
 26 
Within each section, information security controls and their objectives are specified and outlined. 
The information security controls are generally regarded as best practice means of achieving 
those objectives. For each of the controls, implementation guidance is provided.  
5.1.4 NIST  
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology is a non-regulatory federal agency within 
the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST's mission is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial 
competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology.  
In the security field, NIST has been developing standards for cyber and physical assessment and 
protection. 
i. NIST 800 series 
NIST Special Publications in the 800 series present documents of general interest to the 
computer security community. The Special Publication 800 series was established in 1990 to 
provide a separate identity for information technology security publications. This Special 
Publication 800 series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in computer 
security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.’ 
Three of the 800 series have been identified as relevant for our topic. These are: 
i.1 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security (NIST 800-82) 
The document provides guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS). The 
document focuses on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed 
control systems (DCS) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). The document provides an 
overview of these ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities 
to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the 
associated risks. 
The document states that numerous sources have to be taken into account when considering 
potential threats to ICS. These include hostile governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled 
employees, malicious intruders, complexities, accidents, natural disasters as well as malicious or 
accidental actions by insiders. ICS security objectives typically follow the priority of availability, 
integrity and confidentiality.  
The control system incidents are classified in three broad categories:  
i. Intentional targeted attacks such as gaining unauthorized access to files, performing a 
DoS, or spoofing e-mails (i.e., forging the sender’s identity for an e-mail)  
ii. Unintentional consequences or collateral damage from worms, viruses or control system 
failures  
iii. Unintentional internal security consequences, such as inappropriate testing of operational 
systems or unauthorized system configuration changes.  
The document propose a ICS risk assessment methodology in accordance with the more general 
IT systems methodology provided in Special Publication 800-30 Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems. 
i.2 Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (NIST 800-30) 
The document defines risk management as the process of identifying risk, assessing risk, and 
taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level. NIST 800-30 provides a foundation for the 
development of an effective risk management program, containing both the definitions and the 
practical guidance necessary for assessing and mitigating risks identified within IT systems. Risk 
is defined as a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source’s exercising a particular potential 
vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization. 
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The risk management approach in this document is to integrate risk assessment throughout all 
the 5 phases of System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) – Initiation, Development and 
Acquisition, Implementation, Operation and Maintenance, and Disposal. 
A 9 steps risk assessment methodology is proposed as for being applied in each of the SDLC 
phases: 
• Step 1 - System Characterization  
• Step 2 - Threat Identification  
• Step 3 - Vulnerability Identification  
• Step 4 - Control Analysis  
• Step 5 - Likelihood Determination  
• Step 6 - Impact Analysis  
• Step 7 - Risk Determination  
• Step 8 - Control Recommendations  
• Step 9 - Results Documentation. 
Threat identification phase (Step 3) leads to defining a threat statement characterizing the 
system. ‘The threat statement, or the list of potential threat-sources, should be tailored to the 
individual organization and its processing environment (e.g., end-user computing habits)’. Natural 
threats  (e.g., floods, earthquakes, storms) should also be taken into account.  
The threat statement should be developed based on reliable information from different sources, 
among which ‘government and industry organizations’ that ‘continually collect data on security 
events’ thus ‘improving the ability to realistically assess threats. Sources of information include … 
intelligence agencies (for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Infrastructure 
Protection Centre), Federal Computer Incident Response Centre (FedCIRC), Mass media, 
particularly Web-based resources such as SecurityFocus.com, SecurityWatch.com, 
SecurityPortal.com, and SANS.org’ 
As resulting from the proposed methodology, an important source of information when identifying 
the threats is previous incident / attack related data collected in the past. NIST also provides a set 
of recommendations and support documentation for assisting organizations in mitigating the risks 
from information security incidents by providing practical guidance on responding to incidents 
effectively and efficiently in ‘Computer Security Incident Handling Guide’ NIST 800-61. 
i.3 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (NIST 800-61) 
The document presents general incident response guidelines that are independent of particular 
hardware platforms, operating systems, and applications. Specifically, it includes guidance on 
establishing an effective incident response program, but the primary focus of the document is 
detecting, analyzing, prioritizing, and handling incidents. 
An incident is defined as “a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” The benefits of having an incident 
response capability are pointed out as:  
• Responding to incidents systematically so that the appropriate steps are taken  
• Helping personnel to recover quickly and efficiently from security incidents, minimizing 
loss or theft of information, and disruption of services  
• Using information gained during incident handling to better prepare for handling future 
incidents and to provide stronger protection for systems and data  
• Dealing properly with legal issues that may arise during incidents.  
From the attack/effect viewpoint the approach taken in this document tackles the security issue 
from a different perspective than the ones in the documents above. The document supports 
recognizing the incident by the system’s symptoms. In other words, the document addresses the 
monitoring facet of system security.  
The importance of communicating with other outside parties is stressed out throughout the 
document. Details of an incident should be communicated not only to reporting incidents to 
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organizations, but also ‘other involved parties, such as the organization’s Internet service provider 
(ISP), the ISP that the attacker is using, the vendor of vulnerable software, or other incident 
response teams that may be familiar with unusual activity that the handler is trying to understand.’ 
A 4 phase incident response process is proposed for handling incidents, starting from initial 
preparation through post-incident analysis. Recommendations are given for each. 
1. Preparation  
a. Preparing to handle incidents 
b. Preventing incidents 
2. Detection and Analysis 
a. Incident categories 
b. Signs of an incident 
c. Sources of Precursors and Indications  
d. Incident analysis 
e. Incident documentation 
f. Incident prioritization 
g. Incident notification 
3. Containment, Eradication and Recovery 
a. Choose a containment strategy 
b. Evidence gathering and handling 
c. Identifying the attacker 
d. Eradication and recovery 
4. Post-incident activity 
a. Lessons learned 
b. Using collected incident data 
c. Evidence retention 
The general procedure is detailed for 4 main classes of incidents (denial of service, malicious 
code, unauthorized access, inappropriate usage and multiple components). 
5.1.5 NERC 
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC, has as its mission to ensure the 
reliability of the bulk power system in North America. To achieve that, they develop and enforce 
reliability standards, among other activities. NERC is a self-regulatory organization, subject to 
oversight by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental authorities in 
Canada. 
In the last years NERC has produced a set of standards that are mandatory for all the actors in 
the US power infrastructure. 
i. Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector: Control System Cyber Security 
Incident Response Planning. Threat and Incident Reporting 
According to NERC, “the purpose of this guideline is to describe this reporting process and 
encourage organizations to promptly report suspicious activities, threats or acts of sabotage, 
vandalism or terrorism”.  
Moreover, the guidelines are intended to encourage organizations to report significant security 
threats or incidents to the Electricity Sector – Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ESISAC), 
pointing out common benefits the different organizations may get from (promote a timely and 
actionable response in order to prevent the attack or mitigate the consequences on public health 
and safety, the environment and the economy; minimize negative impact on organization repair 
costs, revenues, productivity, customer service and public trust; and demonstrate diligence and 
due care by the organization on behalf of the electricity sector.  
A critical facility is defined as any facility or combination of facilities, that if severely damaged or 
destroyed, would have a significant impact on the ability to serve large numbers of customers for 
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an extended period of time, would have a detrimental impact on the reliability or operability of the 
energy grid or would cause significant risk to public health and safety. 
According to the document, the security threats and actual incidents should be reported to law 
enforcement (e.g., local, state/provincial, FBI/RCMP), government agencies and regulators as is 
necessary or required (e.g., at the state/provincial or federal level), the Electricity Sector’s 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ESISAC); and other electricity sector entities (e.g., 
control areas, reliability coordinators, regional transmission operators, independent 
system/market operators).  
The information to be reported by the power infrastructure actors will vary according to the 
specific circumstances and availability of the information, but should include:  
• date, time and location of the incident  
• brief description of incident  
• impact on critical infrastructure, public health and safety, environment  
• expected duration of impact, or time to restore  
• cause, if known  
• reporting individual and organization, and contact information for follow-up  
• law enforcement involvement  
ii. Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector: Control System Cyber Security 
Incident Response Guideline 
These guidelines address the potential risks that can impact some electricity sector organizations 
and provides practices that can help mitigate the risks. The document states the importance of 
having an incident response plan and provides guidance in creating one. However certain 
decisions about how to manage the incidents are to be made before the actual developing of the 
plan.  
The plan stresses out one of the key aspects in managing the attack: how to react to an attack in 
terms of the ‘forensic’ aspects: ‘The plan should consider the merits of immediate response by 
blockage of a detected intruder as well as a delayed response that allows tracking the intruder 
access up to a certain point. The delayed response view purports to allow an entity time to 
assess the intruder’s entrance strategy, tactics and possible installations, scope of attack, and 
how to utilize the current incident for future prevention. Entities must weigh the pros and cons of 
both options when first embarking on the development of an incident response plan and 
delineating decisions. However, the entity must recognize that the actions put forth in the second 
view exposes the critical cyber systems to prolonged risk during the monitoring and assessment 
activity. (…) Additional decisions and discussions will need to address the trade-off between rapid 
system restoration and collection of evidence required for law enforcement proceedings (e.g., by 
chain of custody and quality of collection processes, tools, and proper documentation).’ 
The following represents a sequence of events that may be used to respond to a cyber security 
incident:  
1. Analyze the Incident  
The incident should be analysed if it meets any of the criteria outlined in the definition 
stage of the program setup. If there are multiple symptoms or potential causes/sources, 
then the events need to be “triaged” or ranked by critical importance regarding escalation 
and remediation.  
2. Respond to the Incident  
Regardless of the method chosen to respond to incidents (i.e., rapid restoration or 
collection of evidence), at this stage an effective Incident Response Plan should 
endeavour to:  
a. Ensure no further damage can/will be done  
b. Contain and compartmentalize existing problem/intrusion  
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c. Keep records of actions taken to aid in learning, reporting, and prosecuting  
d. Save and archive logs from impacted systems, IDSs (Intrusion Detection System) and 
firewalls.  
3. Escalate as Appropriate  
If after initial implementation of the solution the incident is not contained, a pre-determined 
escalation plan should be invoked to augment the people and resources used to combat 
the issue.  
4. Communicate  
When the analysis phase determines that the there is a reportable incident, then the 
communication channels must be opened. However, depending on the level of severity of 
the incident, different communication paths and plans may be appropriate for different 
situations. Further communication as the situation develops may be necessary, and in any 
case a summary report once the cyber security incident is resolved should be provided to 
all individuals at all levels involved in the escalation. Communication could include 
representatives of departments such as: legal, Human Resources, Marketing, Public 
Relations, Business Managers, existing security groups, such as physical security, audit 
or risk management departments, IT and any other employees or team members affected 
by the cyber security incident or its investigation.  
5. Resolve the Incident  
Resolve the threat agent and negate the vulnerability. At this point a post-cyber security 
incident report should be developed. The report itself should include information, such as:  
• Incidence reference number  
• Report author and contact information  
• Summary of systems or assets involved  
• Description of activity  
• Supporting documentation or logs of activity  
• Description of resolution  
• Lessons learned  
The documentation of the cyber security incident that can be reported will be kept for three 
calendar years. Contents of the report should include:  
• How the cyber security incident was contained  
• The cause and source of the compromise  
• Elapsed time from compromise to detection  
• Elapsed time from detection to containment of the threat  
• Costs associated with the cyber security incident  
• How much (if any) down time was caused  
• How future similar cyber security incidents will be prevented  
• Team members involved in remediation of the cyber security incident  
• Policies that will be revised as a result of the incident resolution  
 
6. Monitor for Possible Future Occurrences  
After incident resolution is complete, and operations has returned to normal, monitoring the 
system at a higher level for a period of time, to insure no residual effects remain in the 
system, and that the corrective actions to not introduce any unintended consequences is 
required 
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5.2 Dealing With Cyber Vulnerability: Industry Efforts 
In this age of ubiquitous digitization, cyber security becomes a hot issue. Government, EPRI and 
other leading industry organizations are continuing to develop and deploy new cyber security 
initiatives and technologies [40]. 
Growing concern over the possibility of computer-based security breaches led to development of 
EPRI’s Energy Information Security (EIS) program in 2000. EIS was designed to provide tools 
that individual utilities could use to enhance their own security programs, including cyber security 
awareness training, information sharing, approaches to assessing control system vulnerability, 
and risk management protocols. 
EPRI’s Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) was designed to develop both prevention 
countermeasures and enhanced recovery capabilities. As part of the work to provide utilities with 
immediately useful countermeasures, ISI has documented lessons learned from actual terrorist 
attacks and other catastrophic events at utilities around the world. One of the highlights of this 
effort came in 2004 with a report from Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) on the best practices they 
developed to defend their grid against terrorist attacks. The key conclusions stated in this 
“countermeasures” IEC report are as follows: 
• There is no simple, single checklist for action that is appropriate to all possible 
emergencies. 
• Be prepared for anything, i.e., any scenario you can think of, based on local/national 
information and past experience. 
• Successful defence is based on three elements: people-related work efforts; procedures-
related work efforts and technology/spare equipment-related work efforts. 
The “countermeasures” project is also providing utilities with information on new ways to protect 
grid facilities, including an artificial intelligence technology that can automatically analyze the 
streaming video from large sets of multiple cameras in remote locations. 
High-voltage transformers represent a critical vulnerability among potential infrastructure targets 
that are attractive to terrorists. In response to this threat, ISI came up with the concept and 
developed preliminary designs for a new type of so-called recovery transformer that can be easily 
stored, transported, and installed for emergency use. 
Much progress has been made through the ISI and EIS programs. Considering the complexity of 
the nation’s power infrastructure, the ever increasing capability of cyber attackers, and the 
diverse nature of current security efforts, an industry-wide highly coordinated cyber security 
program was developed by EPRI in cooperation with several industry organizations. As a result, 
an alliance has been formed to create the PowerSec Initiative, which brings together EPRI staff, a 
variety of industry organizations, and several industry experts to address the cyber threat issue 
as it could impact electric utility operational and control equipment. 
One of the objectives for the PowerSec Initiative is to develop an overview of the electric power 
industry’s current cyber security posture by consolidating and leveraging ongoing and completed 
cyber security work from utilities, government, regulatory agencies, and others. The PowerSec 
Initiative will focus first on electric utility SCADA systems and EMS, both of which have been 
identified by experts as critical cyber systems to secure. Information gleaned from the PowerSec 
cyber vulnerability assessment process is intended to complement ongoing security standards 
developed by NERC and the FERC. 
Whereas PowerSec reducing the probable success of attacks, another industry-wide initiative — 
EPRI’s IntelliGrid Consortium features limiting the scope of their effects by working on adaptive, 
self-healing technologies that can be built into the nation’s power delivery system to increase 
overall system resiliency [63]. 
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5.3 National security approaches  
5.3.1 United States of America 
In the following we will discuss some efforts in the United States, as the most representative of 
the worldwide initiatives in the field. Moreover, the US approaches also serve as guidance to 
other national initiatives.  
i. DHS – The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
One of the components of the U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security, The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace [7] offers suggestions, to business, academic, and individual 
users of cyberspace to secure computer systems and networks. The document was prepared 
after a year of research by businesses, universities, and government, and after five months of 
public comment. 
The document identifies three strategic objectives: (1) Prevent cyber attacks against America's 
critical infrastructures; (2) Reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks; and (3) Minimize 
damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur. To meet these objectives, the 
National Strategy outlines five national priorities:  
1. National Cyberspace Security Response System: focuses on improving the government’s 
response to cyberspace security incidents and reducing the potential damage from such 
events.  
2. National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program 
3. National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program 
4. Securing Governments' Cyberspace aim to reduce threats from, and vulnerabilities to, 
cyber attacks.  
5. Establishment of a system of National Security and International Cyberspace Security 
Cooperation: intends to prevent cyber attacks that could impact national security assets 
and to improve the international management of and response to such attacks. 
ii. DHS - Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) 
The DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) conducts 
integrated threat analysis for all Critical Infrastructures/Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors. HITRAC 
brings together intelligence and infrastructure specialists to ensure a comprehensive 
understanding of the risks to U.S. CI/KR. HITRAC works in partnership with the U.S. Intelligence 
Community and national law enforcement (to integrate and analyze intelligence and law 
enforcement information on the threat) and with the sector-specific agencies (SSAs) and owners 
and operators (to ensure that their expertise on infrastructure operations is integrated into threat 
analysis).  
HITRAC develops analytical products by combining intelligence expertise based on all-source 
information, threat assessments, and trend analysis with practical business and CI/KR 
operational expertise informed by current infrastructure status and operations information. The 
analysis is intended to provide an understanding of the threat, CI/KR vulnerabilities, the potential 
consequences of attacks, and the effects of risk-mitigation actions on not only the threat, but also 
on business and operations. This combination of intelligence and practical knowledge allows 
HITRAC to provide CI/KR risk assessment products that contain strategically relevant and 
actionable information. It also allows HITRAC to identify intelligence collection requirements in 
conjunction with owners and operators so that the intelligence community can provide the type of 
information necessary to support the CI/KR protection mission.  
Based on HITRAC analysis, DHS produces two classes of information, addressing both the 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities and the long-term, strategic policies for 
enhancing the protection of US CI/KR.  
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ii.1 HITRAC functions 
The following functions are supported by HITRAC [64]: 
Threat and Incident Information:  
DHS handles intelligence and operations monitoring and reporting from multiple sources to 
provide analysis that is based on the most current information available on threats, incidents, and 
infrastructure status. Real-time analysis of threat, situation, and CI/KR status information 
provided by DHS helps in determining if changes are needed in CI/KR risk management 
measures.  
Specialized products include incident reports and threat warnings. These results are made 
available to appropriate security partners.  
Incident Reports:  
DHS monitors information on incidents to provide reports that CI/KR owners and operators and 
other decision-makers can use with confidence when considering how evolving incidents might 
affect their security posture. The information gathering is a common effort between government 
and private sector operations and watch centers.  
Threat Warnings:  
DHS combines all-source information to provide analysis of emergent threats on a timely basis. 
Many of the indicators that are reported by intelligence or law enforcement are not associated 
with an incident in progress, but are the product of intelligence collection. Such indicators also 
may be of significance only when interpreted in the context of infrastructure operational or status 
information. DHS monitors the flows of intelligence, law enforcement, and private sector security 
information on a 24/7 basis in light of the business, operational, and status expertise provided by 
its owner and operator security partners to produce relevant threat warnings for CI/KR protection. 
This analysis clarifies the implications of intelligence reporting about targeted locations or sectors, 
potential attack methods and timing, or the specific nature of an emerging threat. 
Strategic Planning Information:  
HITRAC analyzes information about terrorist goals, objectives, and attack capabilities to assess 
the potential terrorist attack profiles that might be used against each CI/KR sector. This provides 
the estimate of the potential threat, and is used as a supplement to, or in the absence of, specific 
intelligence and warnings regarding particular targets, attack vectors, or timing. This analysis 
provides decision-makers with the broad, analytically based information on the threat that is 
necessary to inform investment priorities and program design in conjunction with strategic 
planning. It also provides the overarching analytic foundation for incident reports and threat 
warnings produced by DHS and other Federal partners. 
The specialized products developed by HITRAC for strategic planning include a terrorist target 
selection matrix, which outlines plausible means of attack for each of the CI/KR sectors, a catalog 
of attack-specific scenarios, and a sector-specific threat report that provides detailed information 
on the estimated threat facing each sector. In addition to these HITRAC produces special, longer 
term strategic assessments and trends analyses that help define the evolving threat to the CI/KR. 
Terrorist Target Selection Matrix:  
DHS provides threat assessments to SSAs, CI/KR owners and operators, and other security 
partners who require them. It uses the Terrorist Target Selection Matrix produced by HITRAC as 
an analytical tool for identifying which sectors are potentially prone to different terrorist attack 
modalities.  
The matrix maps terrorist goals and objectives against an array of possible attack modalities on a 
sector-by-sector basis. The attacks are classified as ‘unlikely’, ‘modestly attractive’ or ‘attractive’ 
based on the number of objectives of the criminal act accomplished by producing the attack.  
Attack-Specific Threat Scenarios:  
Attack-Specific Threat Scenarios are detailed vignettes of the specific methods, techniques, and 
actions terrorists are likely to use to attack specific types of U.S. CI/KR. The scenarios are based 
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on HITRAC analysis of known terrorist capabilities or on their stated intent as derived from 
intelligence and the study of terrorist tactics, techniques, and capabilities. Threat scenarios are 
specific enough to be used by corporate or facility-level security officers to support operational 
security planning. 
According to HITRAC ‘this product supports facility-level threat surveillance by security forces, 
owner and operator requests for intelligence information, and risk management action planning. It 
also provides detailed threat information for the sector-specific threat assessment described 
below’. 
Sector-Specific Threat Assessment:  
DHS uses the information developed for the Terrorist Target Selection Matrix and the Attack-
Specific Threat Scenarios to produce Sector-Specific Threat Assessments that provide an overall 
assessment of the potential terrorist threats posed to each of the CI/KR sectors, as well as an 
analysis of how these threats relate to sector vulnerabilities and consequences. These 
assessments include known specific and general terrorist threat information for each sector, as 
well as relevant background information such as terrorist objectives and motives as they apply to 
the sector. Each sector-specific report includes the Terrorist Target Selection Matrix for the sector 
and specifies those Attack-Specific Threat Scenarios that may be relevant to the sector. The 
assessments are updated on a routine basis to include the most current intelligence findings and 
operational trends analyses. HITRAC works with each sector to develop and provide threat 
products that are tailored to meet sector-specific and subsector information needs. 
This product is used to support detailed sector-level planning, including SSP development and 
implementation, and also to provide the detailed threat information necessary for additional 
security-related planning. 
ii.2 Threat Assessment (Energy Sector) 
The following types of threat products provided by HITRAC for the Energy Sector [65]: 
• Common Threat Scenarios, which present methods and tactics that could be employed in 
attacks against the U.S. infrastructure; 
• General Threat Environment Assessments, which are sector-specific threat products that 
include known terrorist threat information and long-term strategic assessments and trend 
analyses of the evolving threats to the sector’s critical infrastructure; and 
• Specific Threat Information, which is critical infrastructure-specific information based on 
real-time intelligence, and that will drive short-term measures to mitigate risk. 
The Energy Sector also benefits from the continuation of [65]: 
• Periodic conference calls with asset owners and operators to relay recently reported 
suspicious activities near energy facilities and other pertinent unclassified threat-related 
information; 
• Reports analyzing suspicious activities said to have occurred near energy facilities; 
• Classified threat briefings for representatives of the energy industry. Various Federal 
agencies would use these briefings to inform industry representatives about general and 
specific threats associated with the Energy Sector, as well as the overall threat of 
terrorism to the Nation. Such briefings should include representatives of intelligence 
community members, as appropriate; 
• Improved communications and increased participation with regional, State, and local joint 
terrorism task forces and organizations; and 
• Interagency forums and workgroups, such as the Forum for Infrastructure Protection, 
Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), and other State and local information-
sharing, emergency-planning, and exercise efforts that benefit the Energy Sector as well 
as other participating sectors. 
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These forums and materials provide insights to sector security partners regarding the overall 
threat to the energy industry. More specifically, they help energy facilities, local law enforcement, 
and others to be more aware of potential indicators of terrorist and/or criminal activity. 
iii. DHS Protective Programs 
DHS also sponsors a variety of protective programs: 
Control Systems Security:  
DHS coordinates efforts among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as control 
system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and across all 
CI/KR sectors. 
Federal agencies and the law enforcement community provide information-sharing services and 
programs that support CI/KR protection information sharing. These include: 
DHS Homeland Security Information Network:  
HSIN is a national, Web-based communications platform that allows government entities and 
security partners to obtain, analyze, and share information based on a common operating picture 
of strategic risk and the evolving incident landscape. The network is designed to provide a robust, 
dynamic information-sharing capability that supports both steady-state CI/KR protection and 
incident management activities.  
FBI’s InfraGard:  
InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis effort serving the interests and combining the 
knowledge base of a wide range of members. At its most basic level, InfraGard is a partnership 
between the FBI and the private sector. InfraGard is an association of businesses, academic 
institutions, State and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to 
sharing information and intelligence related to the protection of U.S. CI/KR from both physical and 
cyber threats. InfraGard chapters are geographically linked with FBI Field Office territories. Each 
InfraGard chapter has an FBI Special Agent Coordinator who works closely with Supervisory 
Special Agent Program Managers in the Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters. 
Interagency Cyber Security Efforts:  
Interagency cooperation and information sharing target to improving national counterintelligence 
and law enforcement capabilities in terms of cyber security. The intelligence and law enforcement 
communities have various official and unofficial information-sharing mechanisms in place. Among 
these: 
U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs): provide interagency coordination 
on cyber-based attacks and intrusions. At present, 15 ECTFs are in operation, with an expansion 
planned. 
FBI’s Inter-Agency Coordination Cell: multi-agency group focused on sharing law enforcement 
information on cyber-related investigations. 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section: DOJ, Criminal Division, Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section is responsible for prosecuting nationally significant cases of cyber 
crime and intellectual property crime. In addition to its direct litigation responsibilities, the division 
formulates and implements criminal enforcement policy and provides advice and assistance. 
Cybercop Portal: DHS-sponsored, Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based information-sharing 
mechanism that connects more than 5,300 members of the law enforcement community 
worldwide (including bank investigators and the network security community) involved in 
electronic crimes investigations.  
Law Enforcement Online (LEO):  
The FBI provides LEO as national focal point for electronic communications, education, and 
information sharing for the law enforcement community. The system is intended to provide a 
communications mechanism to link all levels of law enforcement throughout the United States. 
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Regional Information Sharing Systems:  
The RISS Program is a federally funded program administered by DOJ, Office of Justice 
Programs, and Bureau of Justice Assistance. The program is comprised of six regional centers 
that share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many 
locations across jurisdictional lines. Typical targets of RISS activities are terrorism, drug 
trafficking, violent crime, cyber crime, gang activity, and organized criminal activities. The majority 
of the member agencies are at the municipal and county levels; however, more than 485 State 
agencies and more than 920 Federal agencies also participate.  
Sharing National Security Information:  
The ability to share relevant classified information poses a number of challenges, particularly 
when the majority of industry facilities are neither designed for nor accredited to receive, store, 
and dispose of these materials. Ultimately, HSIN may be used to more efficiently share 
appropriate classified national security information with cleared private sector owners and 
operators during incidents, times of heightened threat, or on an as-needed basis. While 
supporting technologies and policies are identified to satisfy this requirement, DHS will continue 
to expand its initiative to sponsor security clearances for designated private sector owners and 
operators, sharing classified information using currently available methods.  
5.3.2 United Kingdom 
i. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)  
CPNI addresses the security of process control and SCADA systems in a series of nine nine 
good practice guidance documents [66] . In the context of the aforementioned documents, Good 
Practice is defined as ‘The best of industry practices such as strategies, activities, or approaches, 
which have been shown to be effective through research and evaluation.’[67]. 
The documents set covers a framework proposed for securing the process control systems from 
electronic attack. The framework – based on industry good practice from process control and IT 
security – focuses on seven key themes: 
• Understand the business risks 
• Implement secure architecture 
• Establish response capabilities 
• Improve awareness and skills 
• Manage third party risks 
• Engage projects 
• Establish ongoing governance. 
The guiding principles at the base of developing the documents are [67]: 
1. Protect (deploy specific protection measures to prevent and discourage electronic attack 
against the process control systems) Detect (establish mechanisms for rapidly identifying actual 
or suspected electronic attacks) and Respond (undertake appropriate action in response to 
confirmed security incidents). 
2. Defense in depth 
3. Technical, Procedural and Managerial protection measurements 
The very first step in risk assessment is ‘Understand the business risks’. According to [67] ‘before 
embarking on a programme to improve security, an organization must first understand the risk to 
the business from potential compromises to process control systems. (…) Only with a good 
knowledge of the business risk can an organization make informed decisions on appropriate 
levels of security and required improvements to working practices.’ 
The business risk is a function of threats, impacts and vulnerabilities. 
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[68] states that ‘organizations need to understand the risk that their businesses are facing in 
order to determine what an appropriate risk appetite (risk level) is, and what security 
improvements are required in order to reduce the level of risk exposure to align with the risk 
appetite.’ Definitions of the key notions are given in the sequel: 
Risk – Possibility of an event occurring that will have a negative impact on the control system. 
The event may be the result of one threat or a combination of threats. 
Risk appetite – The level of risk, used to determine what an acceptable risk is.  
Threat – Any circumstance or event with the potential to harm an process control and SCADA 
system through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial 
of service. 
Likelihood – The probability of a specified outcome. 
Impact – The consequences of a threat taking place. 
Vulnerability – The degree to which a software system or component is open to unauthorized 
access, change, or disclosure of information and is susceptible to interference or disruption of 
system services. 
The good practice principles in undertaking a risk assessment of the process control systems are 
[68]: 
Understand the systems – by conducting a formal inventory audit and evaluation of the process 
control systems. The inventory should contain among others information on the existence, 
location, role, business and safety criticalities of different components (sub-systems) of the 
assessed system. In addition the owner, the management, support provider and ‘how the 
systems interact’ should be provided for each of the identified components.  
Understand the threats – by first identifying and evaluating the threats facing the process control 
systems. The assessment should be performed threat source – threat manner. Among the threat 
sources that should be considered are: 
• Hackers 
• Internal attackers 
• Criminals 
• Illegal information brokers 
• Disgruntled staff 
• Staff undertaking unauthorized actions ( e.g. accessing the Internet) 
• Corporate intelligence 
• Contractors 
• Foreign intelligence services 
• Organized crime 
• Terrorists 
• Protesters and activists (e.g. environmental, political, animal rights). 
The types of threat that should be considered include: 
• Worms (generic, targeted) 
• Hackers (internal, external, external with insider knowledge) 
• Viruses 
• Trojans or backdoors 
• Bots and spyware 
• Loss of integrity 
• Loss of availability (denial of service) 
• Loss of confidentiality 
• Unauthorized control. 
[68] specifies that ‘these threats are somewhat generic so it is useful to consider these into 
example scenarios so that the impacts and any related vulnerabilities can be considered more 
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specifically, care needs to be taken to ensure that the scenarios chosen are wider enough to 
consider all threats.’ 
Example consequences scenarios include: 
• Systemic loss of all machines based on a particular operating system 
• Systemic loss of Ethernet/IP networking technologies 
• Loss (or reduction) of functionality of process control systems 
• Loss of connectivity between the process control systems and 
• Corporate networks 
• Other systems (e.g. supply chain, laboratory systems or other companies) 
• Remote field devices 
• Unauthorized change of setpoints or configuration by malicious or inadvertent actions 
• Accidental change of system configuration by an authorized user 
Understand the impacts – by identifying potential impacts and consequences to the process 
control systems should a threat be realized, based on the scenarios defined in the previous step. 
In this phase, each scenario for each site, system or sub system should be assessed by 
considering what the real life impacts might be, not only on that system, but also for any system 
that it is dependent upon.  
Due to the intrinsic differences between the regular engineering systems and the IT systems, a 
‘traditional’ quantifying the consequences in monetary terms might not be feasible. Thus, the 
following are provided as examples of possible ‘real life’ impact descriptions: 
Safety, Health and Environmental event or damage to plant: an event that results in 
harm to individuals, the environment or damage to the plant. 
Non-compliance with regulatory requirements or minor Safety, Health and 
Environmental event: an event that results in the site being non-compliant with 
regulatory requirements.  
Forced controlled shutdown of operations: an event that results in the emergency 
shutdown system being automatically invoked with no human intervention.  
Elected controlled shutdown of operations: an event that results in the site electing to 
shutdown its operations.  
Reduction in operating efficiency: an event that would result in the plant continuing its 
operations in a less efficient or profitable manner or result in reduced production.  
No Impact: no impact on operations. 
Other impacts that should be considered are: 
• loss of confidential information 
• damage to Critical National Infrastructure 
• loss of business continuity 
• reputation 
• value or supply chain. 
Time variance of impact: when considering the impact of a particular threat then it is important 
to consider how that threat might vary with time.  
Successive impacts: the effect of coincident or successive impacts should be considered, this is 
especially important where a common cause failure could be responsible 
Understand the vulnerabilities  
Understanding vulnerabilities involves a detailed review of all the system elements, (e.g. servers, 
workstations, network infrastructure etc.) to determine any vulnerability that might exist. 
Examples of common vulnerability areas include: 
• Connections to other systems 
• Remote access 
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• Physical security 
• Anti-virus protection 
• Access control 
• Passwords and accounts 
• Security patching 
• System monitoring 
• System resilience and continuity 
• Third parties who produce code for plant systems 
i.1 Outputs of understanding the business risk 
The key outputs from this are inventory, prioritized sites and systems, list of key threats based on 
impact assessment, prioritized vulnerabilities. 
A different layer assessment approach is proposed for applying this risk assessment 
methodology [68]. In order to overcome the complexity of large organizations one should first 
perform a ‘high level risk assessment’, followed by a low-level site/system assessment. 
Regarding phase 1, [68] states that ’The first iteration of the risk assessment provides an 
enterprise level view of the process control security risk. It will provide an indication of the 
security gaps with the greatest impact to the enterprise by considering the ‘value chain’, 
interdependencies and impacts that have enterprise level significance. The analysis will provide 
the enterprise with both the priority security issues and the sites that should be addressed first.’ 
The results of the assessment may be very well suited for being represented in a Boston Grid 
(risk matrix). This approach eases the priority order identification. Moreover, it is recommended 
that the risk parameters be plotted in a Site Risk Table (Threat, Attractiveness, and Vulnerability). 
Phase 1 plays a key role in Individual sites/systems risk assessment. The low-level assessment 
builds on the key risk areas prior identified. On this, [68] states that ‘(…) After selecting the initial 
site priority for the organization, the same process can be used at a site level to help each site 
determine their priorities. Each site creates a more detailed inventory and then assesses the 
individual assets in terms of threats, impacts and vulnerabilities. This way a site can prioritize 
which assets or services should be tackled first.’ 
Once an enterprise risk assessment has been carried out a similar process of understanding the 
systems, threats, impacts and vulnerabilities, should be followed at a site, system and asset level 
to understand the business risk relating to that level 
 
5.3.3 The Netherlands 
i. National Advisory Centre on Critical Infrastructure (NAVI) 
In the Netherlands, The National Advisory Centre on Critical Infrastructure (NAVI) has been 
created as a public-private joint-venture, in order to connect government and business in the 
protection of the critical physical and digital infrastructure. 
According to [69], ‘NAVI is intended for anyone with a responsibility for critical infrastructure. As a 
public-private joint venture, it works with both government and business parties. NAVI targets 
specific actors:  
• managers, including security managers, in business enterprises in the critical sectors; 
• representatives of professional associations and industry organizations;  
• policy officers at government levels.’  
In its security management development mission, NAVI focuses of four core activities: 
Advice on security protection to the owners and managers of critical infrastructure in the 
Netherlands. It conducts risk analyses, issues second opinions on existing security protection 
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plans, evaluates risk analyses of existing and proposed security measures. The service is 
provided in response to client need.  
Knowledge and information exchange on security protection 
‘NAVI ensures that parties working in the critical sectors in the Netherlands can share knowledge 
and information.’ Contacts with government bodies and business enterprises operating in the 
critical sectors and with relevant contacts and organizations abroad are established maintained.  
Knowledge and information is available by organizing meetings, communicating via NAVI 
website, and providing access to its knowledge bank.  
Product development 
NAVI develops products (manuals, solutions) that can be used within entire sectors or even 
multiple sectors. For instance, it is currently developing a series of manuals on various aspects of 
security protection.  
Networking 
NAVI maintains and develops a wide network of contacts among security professionals, and it 
serves as a meeting point for critical infrastructure parties in government, research and business 
at home as well as abroad. 
NAVI is a product of the National Security Strategy, subject of the next section. 
ii. National Security Strategy 
In the Netherlands, an ‘all risk’ approach is taken to tackle the National security. The Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations is in charge with National Security Strategy. The strategy 
targets the protection of ‘society and citizens within Dutch territory against internal and external 
threats’ [70]. 
The referenced document states that the National security is endangered whenever ‘vital 
interests of our state and/or our society are threatened to such an extent that it might lead to 
societal disruption.’ Moreover, ‘(…) national security encompasses both breach of security by 
intentional human actions (security) and breach due to disasters, system or process faults, 
human failure or natural anomalies such as extreme weather (safety)’. 
The strategy focuses on five facets of security: territorial, economic, ecological, physical, and 
social and political stability. All of these facets are explicitly used in the recommended risk 
assessment method. 
The document sketches a three stage working method for reinforcing national security [70]: 
Stage 1: Analysis of threats and assessment of risks 
The analysis and the assessment of the threats in terms of risks to vital interests and a pair-wise 
weighing of these risks is performed in this phase. The assessed risks are then prioritized for 
follow-up in the next stage. 
The analysis is based on three time-horizons: long term (from approx. 5 years), mid term (up to 
approx. 5 years) and short term (up to approx. 6 months). This changes the perspective of the 
analyses from exploratory (long term), to policy-based (mid term) and action-oriented (short term) 
[70]. The existing sector-oriented procedures are used in analysis and risk assessment; however, 
the procedures are merged to enable an integral approach. 
 
Stage 2: Strategic planning 
In this stage the government determines which capabilities it would require to deal with the 
prioritized risks and which capabilities it already possesses and/or can expect from external 
parties such as the business community, social organizations and international organizations.  
The strategic planning relies on a capabilities-based approach (capabilities based planning – 
CBP). According to [70], ‘this approach is not geared towards one specific threat or risk. Rather it 
 41
focuses on what is necessary to prevent the consequences of threats or risks as much as 
possible (prevention) and/or to be prepared (preparation and response)’. 
Stage 3: Follow-up 
The political-administrative choices (e.g., policy, legislation and concrete measures) are 
developed at this level. 
For supporting the risk assessment at a national level (Stage 1), the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations provides methodological guidance in National Risk Assessment Method 
Guide [71], subject of the next section.  
iii. National Risk Assessment Method Guide 
This document adopts an all hazard approach for risk assessment. ‘Scenarios for floods, 
pandemics and long-term failures of utility supplies, for example, and for terrorist attacks are 
described in an unambiguous manner, backed up by figures, and aggregated.’ [71] The 
advantage of this approach is that the assessment results of intrinsic different systems are 
rendered comparable, thus making, for instance, prioritizing actions possible. 
[71] states that the national security is endangered whenever ‘vital interests of the Dutch state 
and/or society are threatened in such a way that there is a question of - potential - social 
disruption.’ The vital interests are defined as: territorial security, physical safety (public health), 
economic (undisrupted working of the economy), environmental security and social and political 
stability.  
The suggested risk methodology takes as read that threats are described in the form of 
scenarios. According to the referenced document, ‘this is the most important information for the 
application of the methodology; requirements are set for those scenarios.’ 
Other characteristics of this method are given in the sequel [71]: 
• despite the ‘all hazard’ approach, some distinctions must be made between natural 
threats (hazards, in the form of flooding, for example) and those triggered by humans, 
malicious threats (threats, in the form of terrorist attacks, for example); 
• the method is scientifically sound, and consists of a combination of existing, proven parts 
of methodologies, as well as new elements that have been developed to meet the 
requirements of the national risk assessment; 
• the method is as transparent as possible, seeking a balance between comprehensibility 
and simplicity on the one hand, and on the other hand the capability to facilitate what is, in 
itself, a complex assessment; 
• the method offers the ingredients and the methodology to rank scenarios from a 
multidisciplinary perspective by risk, leaving scope for administrative input about what is 
considered more or less important and for other aspects of policy judgment; 
• an analysis of the sensitivity of the results to changes in seriousness and importance 
judgments is part of the NRA. 
Risk is defined as a composition of the impact (total of the consequences of the incident 
scenario) and likelihood (a forecast about the occurrence of the incident scenario). 
The risk is computed based on an Incident scenario. A scenario should fulfill the following 
requirements: plausibility, relevancy, consistency, usable, time related. Thus, a scenario: 
• must be a plausible story, with factual supporting information; or, put another way, a 
report on events that may occur in the (near) future; 
• must be relevant to the objective of the scenario analysis and representative for one of the 
security topics selected; 
• must be consistent and logically structured; 
• is mentally usable and therefore can be explained to and is acceptable to others; 
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• includes the time horizon and the policy field or security topic to which it relates, including 
specific questions that are on the agenda. 
In the national risk assessment context, a scenario is a description of [71]: 
• (the nature and scale of) one or more related events (incidents) which have 
• consequences for national security; 
• the lead-up to the incident, consisting of the (underlying) cause and the trigger which 
actually brings about the incident; 
• the context of the events, indicating the general circumstances and the degree of 
vulnerability and resistance of people, object and society, where relevant to the incident 
described; 
• the consequences of the incident, indicating the nature and scale; 
• the effects of the incident on the continuity of critical infrastructure. 
More specifically, each scenario must contain information about: 
• pressure on the physical environment; 
• pressure on (critical) infrastructure; 
• the pressure on people and society with particular attention to aspects of trust by the 
population, foreknowledge by the population about risk and institutional embedding; 
• pressure on institutions and government. 
A list of different impact criteria is also provided in the referenced document [71] for guidance 
purposes.  
Once the scenario set is ready, the assessment methodology goes as follows [71]: 
Step1 –  Check on completeness of the scenario description. 
The scenario must contain the information enabling assessment of the impact and the likelihood. 
Step 2 –  Assess the impact of the scenario. 
Each scenario is analyzed and assessed impact criteria. The impact criteria are directly related to 
the five vital security interests. The individual impact scores are merged into a (qualitative and 
quantitative) final score per scenario. The multi-criteria analysis that is necessary for this step 
does, in itself, require that a number of steps be gone through.  
Step 3 – Assess the likelihood of the scenario. 
Each scenario is analyzed and assessed on the likelihood of it occurring. In doing so, a distinction 
is made between scenarios describing a natural form of hazard (and where it is plausible that 
historic data is available to some extent), and scenarios describing a threat caused deliberately 
(and where it is plausible that an assessment of likelihood must be based mainly on intelligence 
and forecasts). The likelihood is expressed at least qualitatively and wherever possibly 
quantitatively. 
Step 4 – Assess the risk of the scenario. 
A risk matrix is proposed for this task. Assessments of the impact and likelihood of all scenarios 
are brought together in a two-dimensional risk diagram. Based on this diagram, a clustering by 
priority can be shown. For the impact assessment, in particular, sensitivity analyses are used 
because there is a high level of subjectivity in assessing the degree of impact and relative 
importance of the various types of impact.  
Step 5 – Presentation of the analysis result. 
Despite the aggregated character of the risk, and the associated classification into priority 
clusters, attention must also be paid to the underlying findings. These include, in any case, 
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mentioning the most basic “impact drivers” per scenario and indicating the robustness of the final 
score on impact. 
The end product of the risk assessment is a report to the Cabinet. This report contains the 
following sections: 
• a description of the scenarios used; 
• a description of the methodology used; 
• a report on the findings, including the scenario assessment and scores; 
• a recommendation to the Cabinet about capabilities that should be incorporated into the 
strategic planning as a priority (put on the agenda); 
The report meets the following quality requirements [71]: 
• the incident scenarios are described uniformly (according to a format), they are possible, 
and can vary in seriousness from fairly serious to the worst imaginable; 
• the incident scenarios are practical, to the extent that it is possible to derive planning 
assumptions for the strategic planning. This means that based on the scenario, it is clear 
which capabilities will have to be used; 
• the guide gives an accessible, transparent description of the methodology; • the 
methodology maintains a good balance between transparency, practical usability and 
scientific substantiation; 
• the methodology must be suitable to compare incident scenarios (as a translation of the 
risks) against each other, based on criteria derived from the vital interests of national 
security; 
• the method indicates how the criteria can be made operational.  
5.3.4 Sweden 
In Sweden, risk and vulnerability analyses must be conducted by all governmental agencies. The 
assessment must be carried out in accordance to the ordinance on emergency preparedness and 
heightened state of alert [72].  
According to section 9 of the Emergency Preparedness Ordinance [72], governmental agencies 
shall – for the purpose of strengthening both their own and society’s emergency preparedness – 
conduct annual analyses of whether vulnerabilities, or threats and risks, exist within their areas of 
responsibility that could severely degrade operational capabilities. In conducting this analysis, 
special consideration shall be taken to: 
• situations that arise quickly, unexpectedly and without warning, or a situation in which 
there is a threat or a risk that such a situation can arise. 
• situations that require rapid decisions and co-ordination with other parties. 
• that the most necessary critical societal functions can be maintained. 
• the capability to deal with very serious situations within the agency’s area of responsibility. 
The document mainly deals with governmental agencies being able to guarantee that they can 
maintain functions that are needed to uphold emergency preparedness capabilities, even when 
exceptional events occur. Both cases, ordinary operations and exceptional events should be 
taken into account when dealing to risk assessment [73]. According to [73], ‘…this can entail that 
requirements that are sufficient for ordinary operations are not sufficient when exceptional events 
occur, and that the agencies therefore require enhanced capabilities, such as expanded 
command and information capacities.’  
[73] also states that ‘(…)To improve society’s collective capabilities to prevent or reduce the 
effects of exceptional events, it is important that we have knowledge of what the threats and risks 
are, and where society is vulnerable.’ 
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The purpose of the assessment is to enhance Sweden’s capabilities in emergency preparedness 
and response. 
The agency level assessments are compiled and analyzed by the Swedish Emergency 
Management Agency (SEMA). SEMA also provides ‘Risk and vulnerability analyses’ [73] as a 
guide for assessment methodology to be used at agency level. 
We list in the sequel the definition of the key notions addressed by the aforementioned document. 
The relevance of those is to express the position Sweden takes towards the considered issues. 
Thus, 
Exceptional event is an event that deviates from the norm, which entails serious disruptions or 
impending risks for serious disruptions to critical societal functions, and that requires prompt 
responses. 
Capability in this context refers to the robustness and capacity that is needed to avoid and deal 
with serious emergencies. 
Crisis management capability refers to an organization’s capability during serious disruptions to 
lead its own operations, to make decisions within its area of operations or responsibility, to 
quickly distribute correct and reliable information, and when necessary, to be able to co-ordinate 
with other parties and their actions.  
Operative capability refers to the capability that entities deployed “in the field” need to initiate 
and conduct the measures required to assist, protect and lessen the effects of that which has 
occurred as quickly as possible. 
The capability in critical societal functions to resist serious disruptions refers to the 
capability needed for operations to be conducted at such a level that society – despite a serious 
disruption – can still function and ensure fundamental service, security and care. 
Threat embraces an entity’s capacity and intention to conduct destructive actions. A threat can 
even consist of an event or phenomenon that in itself produces danger to something or someone 
without there being entities with the capacity and intention to cause damage in the context. 
Critical dependency is defined as a relationship in which the dependent organization is quickly 
and lastingly affected by a substantial decline in function during a reduction or severe disruption 
in the providing organization. Conditions for critical dependencies are: 
• the providing organization cannot be easily replaced with another organization 
• the societal consequences of the dependent organization’s functional reduction become 
sufficiently serious that the current emergency cannot be dealt with in an acceptable 
manner. 
Risk can on a purely technical plane refer to a weighing of the probability that an event will occur 
and the (negative) consequences that this event can produce. In relation to threats, a risk is to be 
viewed as a more concrete effect of various occurrences. Climatic changes (threat) can, for 
example, entail an increased probability for, and greater consequences of, for widespread 
flooding (risk). 
Risk analysis can be described as a systematic method of identifying risks and evaluating them 
with regard to probability and consequences. 
Vulnerability denotes how much and how seriously a society or parts of a society are influenced 
by an event. The consequences that an entity or society – despite certain capabilities – does not 
manage to foresee, handle, resist or recover from indicates the degree of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability analysis can be described as a systematic method of evaluating and determining 
vulnerability. 
SEMA’s proposes a 4 steps approach to enhancing the nation’s emergency preparedness: 
• Identification of threats and risks 
• Evaluation 
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• Capability assessment 
• Results and reporting 
• Identification of threats and risks 
Identification is to be based on a governmental agency’s area of responsibility. It is important to 
identify threats and risk within the agency’s area of responsibility that other entities are expected 
to deal with. In a corresponding manner, it is important to include threats and risks beyond the 
area of responsibility but that can nonetheless affect the agency’s function.  
According to [73] the objective of identifying threats and risks are: 
• increase a governmental agency’s knowledge and awareness for the purpose of 
strengthening its own and society’s emergency preparedness; 
• find the reasons and conditions that permit an event to escalate into a situation that 
seriously degrades the capacity for operations in an area; 
• discover critical dependencies within and between sectors and geographic areas. 
Evaluation of threats and risks 
The process in this step follows the ‘classic’ approach of risk assessment: evaluate the frequency 
and the consequences of a disruptive event, and then aggregate the results to obtain the risk in a 
quantitative or qualitative manner.  
The frequencies may be evaluated both by quantitative and qualitative approaches. The 
quantitative approach should be used when empirical estimates (based on, for example, 
statistical material) are available. On the quantitative assessment [73] states that  ‘(…) In many 
cases, expert assessments must be used to estimate probability, either to complement empirical 
data or as the sole relevant source. Probability is assessed based on the subjective estimates of 
persons with good knowledge of the pertinent conditions.’ 
Assessing consequences concerns predicting the direct and indirect (negative) effects that can 
arise based on certain given conditions [73]. There are cases when qualitative descriptions of the 
consequence are sufficient. However, in some other cases, quantitative consequences in regard 
to, for example, number, scope or size is required for a sustainable assessment. SEMA proposes 
a 5 levels scale for qualitative consequence characterization, as follows: 
Level 1 – Very limited consequences 
Minor direct health effects, very limited disruptions to societal functionality, passing distrust of 
single societal institution. 
Level 2 – Limited 
Moderate direct health effects, limited disruptions to societal functionality, passing distrust of 
several societal institutions. 
Level 3 – Serious 
Significant direct or moderate indirect health effects, serious disruptions to societal func-
tionality, enduring distrust of several societal institutions or changed behavior. 
Level 4 – Very serious 
Major direct or significant indirect health effects, very serious disruptions to societal 
functionality, enduring distrust of several societal institutions or changed behavior.  
Level 5 – Catastrophic 
Catastrophic direct or major indirect health effects, extreme disruptions to societal func-
tionality, firmly rooted distrust of societal institutions and general instability. 
Risk evaluation is intended to rank the threats and risks that have been assessed based on 
probability and consequence. To make an evaluation more easy to survey, [73] uses classes in 
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which both the probability and the consequence are assessed on a scale from one (very low 
probability) to five (very high probability).  
According to [73], ‘(…) By presenting the results in a matrix, we show how risks relate to one 
another in an easy-to-grasp manner. This facilitates matters for other entities in easily utilizing the 
results of a governmental agency’s evaluation.’ 
 
Capability assessment and analysis of vulnerability 
‘That an agency assesses its capability is thus a central aspect in a risk and vulnerability 
analysis. By taking measures to improve its capability, an agency can consequently contribute to 
reducing society’s degree of vulnerability’ [73] 
The capability that is needed to avoid and deal with emergency preparedness capability consists 
of three components: 
• crisis management capability; 
• operative capability; 
• capability to resist serious disruptions in critical societal functions. 
The governmental agencies should assess these three capabilities for all identified risks. The 
method proposed is based on indicator sets. [73] proposes three sets of indicator for Crisis 
management capability, Operative capability, and Capability to resist serious disruptions in critical 
societal functions 
The main advantage of using the same indicator sets is – according to SEMA – that it makes it 
easier to compare agencies’ capability assessments with one another and over time, even thou 
the relevance of individual indicators vary from agency to agency and from scenario to scenario. 
In SEMA approach, after relevant indicators have been selected for a particular situation, the next 
step is to “rate” the capability. The recommended procedure is to use a four level capability 
assessment scale. The agency capability is thus classified as [73]: 
Level 1 – Capability is good 
Level 2 – capability is primarily good, but has some deficiencies 
Level 3 – There is a certain capability, but it is insufficient 
Level 4 – There is no or insufficient capability. 
The assessment resulting data is used by SEMA to compile a comprehensive picture of how 
capabilities can be developed within various areas from year to year, to make comparisons 
between different agencies and sectors, and to weigh together the various agencies’ 
assessments into a collective assessment of society’s capability. 
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